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I. INTRODUCTION

Most people familiar with film and literature in the past two
decades will recognize two dystopias that recur in our popular
imagination. Dystopia 1 describes a society fallen in on itself, chaotic
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and violent. It is a state of nature, of constant battle between factions
with a government unable to secure the peace. It is a picture of neverending civil war. 1 Dystopia 2 is markedly opposite, a society of order
and rules in which the state regulates all areas of life carefully, weeds
out the bad guys and segregates them for the common good. Those who
belong live a peaceful life as long as they obey the state. 2 Those who do
not are removed to life in a camp where they cannot infect society with
their presence or are simply disappeared. Of course, there are many
other dystopias and utopias ranging from the alien to the mundane;
however, it is these two in particular with which we obsess in the United
States in the post 9/11 era. These two have become for us the Scylla and
Charybdis of inclusion and exclusion, vulnerability and security. The
fear that multicultural tolerance will lead to a “beirutization” of our
society has led for calls for greater regulation of the undesirable
elements of society, for tighter demarcations of the rights and
obligations of “belonging” and the detention and expulsion of those who
clearly fall out of that demarcation. 3
It is in the context of this broader debate on multiculturalism versus
assimilation and the war on terror that a number of states have
considered enacting measures to prevent the use of shari’ah4 or Islamic
law in state courts. These measures have been justified as necessary to
ensure our national security and to prevent shari’ah from creeping into
our legal system. 5 In the words of an Oklahoma lawmaker, it is a
“preemptive strike.” 6 This Article challenges these claims by arguing
that there is no threat of shari’ah taking root in our judicial system to the
detriment of our constitutional rights. Further, given that most of the
1. For an example of this in popular film, see CHILDREN OF MEN (Universal Studios 2006);
THE HANDMAID’S TALE (MGM Studios 1990).
2. See, e.g., ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); George Orwell, 1984 (1949);
An interesting take on the transition from chaos to conformity is V for Vendetta (Warner Brothers
2005).
3. David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38
HARV. CIV. RTS & CIV. LIBERTIES L.REV. 1, 1-30 (2003).
4. I use the spelling “shari’ah” to denote the complex legal system that is an umbrella term
for the legal science and custom that exists in the Muslim world in all its diversity. On the other
hand, “sharia law” is used by the lawmakers who typically reduce the body of knowledge down to
denote a regressive subset of rules or even a constructed entity that may have little relationship to
the laws that have governed Muslims at different periods of history. For an overview of Islamic
legal history, see KNUT S. VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (2005).
5. Amy Sullivan, The Sharia Myth Sweeps America, USA TODAY (June 12, 2011, 5:28
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-06-12-Sharia-law-in-the-USA_n.htm.
6. Joel Siegel, Islamic Sharia Law to Be Banned in, ah, Oklahoma, ABC NEWS (June 14,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/Media/oklahoma-pass-laws-prohibiting-islamic-sharia-laws-apply
/story?id=10908521.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/2

2

Choudhury: Shari'ah Law
ARTICLE 2 - CHOUDHURY (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/4/2013 4:12 PM

SHARI’AH LAW

51

examples of shari’ah creep come from family law cases, the link to
national security is illusory. Instead, in this Article, I will argue, these
measures should be read as a part of the ongoing project to define
national identity that partakes of a broader identity discourse about
Muslims and Americans (as mutually exclusive) in the War on Terror.
As a result, the laws have social effects such as toleration for profiling
and calls for expressions of patriotism that negatively impact the lives of
ordinary Muslims. 7 I will further argue that rather than becoming
distracted with these projects that are primarily aimed at scoring political
points, the needs of U.S. domestic security are better served by including
Muslims as full citizens. Indeed, national security is advanced by
recognizing the reality that Muslims have a stake in the protection of the
homeland. The political diversity within the Muslim community, some
part of which has supported the War on Terror while others have
critiqued it, does nothing to diminish the importance of this fact.
The Article proceeds in three parts: in Part II, the Article describes
three anti-shari’ah measures. 8 It describes Oklahoma’s Save Our State
amendment to show how these laws target Islam. It also reviews the
recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the
grant of a preliminary injunction against the certification of Oklahoma’s
constitutional amendment. It then describes Arizona’s law that targets
shari’ah as well as other legal traditions. It also examines the original
version of the Tennessee bill to illustrate the motivations behind the
revised, watered down version that was eventually passed by the
legislature. Part II concludes with an examination of the chief architects
of the model law disseminated to various states and their motivations.9
The aim is to show how the drafters of the laws were preoccupied not by
protecting Americans from a threat of terrorists in their midst, but by
defining “American” identity through the law. 10
In Part III of this Article, I take a deeper look into the claim that the
laws are necessary because “shari’ah creep” is occurring through family
7. Samuel R. Gross and Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L.R.
1413, 1413-1414 (2002).
8. Louisiana has also passed an anti-foreign law measures, see HB 785 Act. No. 714, 2010
Leg.,
36th
Sess.
(La.
2010)
available
at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/
streamdocument.asp?did=722536 (last visited, Mar. 9, 2012).
9. See infra notes 26-74 and accompanying text. This article does not argue that the courts
should rely on shari’ah to settle matters or that there should be more use of Islamic law. I take the
position that, if religious laws are accommodated by the judiciary, that all religious laws be given
equal standing without prejudice against a single religion. Further, my own normative preference is
that wherever possible, secular law be used and that all religious law in general be excluded from
judicial determinations.
10. See infra notes 75-187 and accompanying text.
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law and will eventually bleed into other doctrinal areas of our secular
system. 11 Consequently, I focus on a number of family cases here to
show how the courts have dealt with religious law in the United States,
particularly in enforcing foreign judgments from Muslim majority
countries. 12 This analysis makes clear that family law is not the gateway
for shari’ah to enter the judicial system (thereby posing a threat to our
security) and that such a view discounts the robust constitutional, choice
of law rules and public policy preferences that restrain judges from
diluting our secular system. 13
Finally, in Part IV, I raise the question of what these laws are really
about if they are not about shari’ah creep or our security. 14 I argue that
while these laws may be discounted as ineffectual or unconstitutional,
they have an effect on society. They continue the socially acceptable
expulsion of Muslims from the mainstream and their marginalization.
Far from being innocuous, such strategies of (re)constructing Muslims as
the enemy have real lived consequences such as heightened surveillance
regulation, incarceration, and even death.
I conclude with some observations about decoupling stereotypes of
racial and religious identity from counter-terrorism and integration as
opposed to assimilation as a way forward. 15 In this final section, I argue
that rather than being distracted by creating outsider groups based on
identity, our security is better served through inclusion of all those who
have a stake in the security of their communities and their families.
II. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?: STATE ANTI-SHARI’AH LAWS
In the decade following 9/11, there has been a great deal of concern
about the ability of Muslims to assimilate into the American
mainstream. 16 In addition, there was also a worry that Islam and
democracy are in some fundamental ways incompatible and that, indeed,
American Muslims could not be faithful to both their religion and their
11. See infra notes 89-187 and accompanying text.
12. Id. In most Muslim-majority countries, the only place that shari’ah continues to play a
significant role is in family law. See, e.g., Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The
Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1043 (2004). It is no surprise, then, that it is family law
cases that make up the bulk of the “shari’ah creep” examples in the United States.
13. See generally Jill Schachner Chanen, Anti-Shariah Bills Under Review, ABA JOURNAL
(May 1, 2011, 2:20 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_law_of_the_land/.
14. See infra notes 188-301 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 302-311 and accompanying text.
16. See Robert Steinback, Jihad Against Islam, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, no. 142, 2011,
available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/
summer/jihad-against-islam.
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country. This anxiety has manifested itself periodically throughout the
decade, from the immediate rounding up and profiling of Muslims right
after the attacks to the Presidential election in 2008, when the
“allegation” that Barack Obama was a closet Muslim was made into a
campaign issue and refuted as a “slur.” 17 The fear of Muslims and Islam
failed to derail Obama’s campaign, but it became entrenched in our
political discourse.18 In other words, the use of “Islam” and the Muslim
problem as a political rallying tool has become commonplace.19 Under
these circumstances, it comes as no surprise that politicians would turn
to the drafting and enactment of laws to deal with this “problem” as a
vital step in preventing the multiculturalism-gone-wrong dystopia
described above.
At the time of this writing, Oklahoma, Arizona, Tennessee, and
Louisiana have passed some form of anti-shari’ah or anti-foreign law
measure. 20 In addition to these, a significant number of states were
considering, had introduced, or were in the process of passing similar
bills. 21 Mississippi and Utah had attempted to pass bills but failed to do
so. 22 Complicating matters somewhat, some of the bills introduced were
challenged immediately and were amended to remove references to
shari’ah. 23 Undoubtedly, other bills will also be amended to read
neutrally as they are also challenged. Yet, the challenges have not
dampened the appetite for the bills. The number of states joining this
17. See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Collateral Damage: The Ghettoization of Muslims in the
Race to the White House, in RACE 2008: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON A HISTORIC CAMPAIGN 62
(Mendible, ed., 2010).
18. Id. See also Barry A. Hollander, The Persistence in the Perception of Barack Obama as
a Muslim in the 2008 Presidential Campaign, 9 J. MEDIA AND RELIG. 55, 55 (2010) (finding that
media reports debunking the view that Obama is a Muslim did little to change perception); see
generally Stephen Parks, The Birthers’ Attacks and the Judiciary’s Article III “Defense” of the
Obama Presidency, 38 S.U. L. REV. 179 (2011).
19. Leon Hadar’s observations from 1992 shed some historical light on this trend. Two
decades ago, well before al Qaeda’s attack on the United States, the basic groundwork of creating
the green peril were already in place. See Leon T. Hadar, Policy Analysis: The “Green Peril”:
Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS, no. 177 (Aug. 27,
1992), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa177.pdf.
20. Chanen, supra note 13.
21. Bill Raftery, Bans on court use of sharia/international law: ABA House of Delegates
opposes “blanket prohibitions,” state legislatures out of session, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/08/08/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-aba-house-ofdelegates-opposes-blanket-prohibitions-state-legislatures-out-of-session/.
22. Tim Murphy, Map: Has Your State Banned Sharia?, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 11, 2011,
8:40 AM PST), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/02/has-your-state-banned-sharia-map.
23. The bill’s progression from an explicit anti-shari’ah ban to a neutral law can be found on
the website of the Tennessee legislature. Amendment 3 to SB1028, TENNESSEE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/107/Amend/SA0654.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
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trend is growing. 24 Below, I examine the legal enactments introduced in
Oklahoma and the challenge to it in the Tenth Circuit. I also describe
the Arizona, Tennessee (as originally introduced), and Louisiana laws.25
These laws are representative of the trend that other states inclined to
pass anti-shari’ah measures may follow. As the description reveals, the
laws generalize broadly about shari’ah, failing to show any real
understanding of the legal tradition. Rather, they rely on unexamined
assumptions that, first, shari’ah is incompatible with our legal system,
and, second, it poses a danger that can be prevented by such enactments.
A.

State Anti-Shari’ah Bills
1. Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” Amendment

Oklahoma’s Constitutional amendment is brief and to the point.
State Question 755, otherwise referred to as the “Save Our State”
amendment, asks whether the following should be approved:
The courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when
exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law
as provided for in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and
rules promulgated thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of
the United States provided the law of the other state does not include
Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to
the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of
this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts
26
including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.

The ballot title for the amendment read as follows:
This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that
deals with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1.
It makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. It
forbids courts from considering or using international law. It forbids
24. John Esposito, Norway attacks a wakeup call for a world, WASH. POST BLOG (July 30,
2011, 7:27 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/post/norway-attacks-a-wakeupcall-for-a-world/2011/07/29/gIQAZ4N4iI_blog.html.
25. S.B. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (effective July 1, 2011 as
2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 497); H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2011); Okla. Const. art. VII, §
1(C).
26. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., (Okla. 2010) (State Question Number 755), available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf.
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courts from considering or using Sharia Law.
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the
conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as
countries, states and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each
other. It also deals with some of their relationships with persons.
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations.
Sources of international law also include international agreements, as
well as treaties.
Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the
27
Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.

This broadly stated provision prevents state courts from using shari’ah or
even considering it in deciding cases. The initial draft of the ballot title
and measure was submitted to the Secretary of State and reviewed by the
attorney general as part of the process for submission to the electorate. 28
It is of interest here that, as originally drafted, the ballot title did not
define shari’ah. For that reason, the attorney general declared that it did
not meet the requirements of applicable state law because it failed to
“adequately explain the effect of the proposition because it does not
explain what either shari’ah law or international law is.”29 In order to
remedy this defect, the attorney general’s office then provided the
following statement: “Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two
principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.” 30 The
state defines shari’ah with a tautological non-definition (Islamic law)
and acknowledges only two sources of law. 31 The measure passed in the
general election with 70.08% of voters in favor. 32

27. Id.
28. Letter from M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y of State, to W.A. Drew Edmondson, Okla.
Att’y Gen. (May 25, 2010) (on file with author), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/
questions/755.pdf.
29. Letter from W.A. Drew Edmondson, Okla. Att’y Gen., to M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y
of State (June 2, 2010) (on file with author), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/
documents/questions/755.pdf. Amendments to the state’s constitution consist of two parts; first, a
ballot title that explains the proposed amendment and, second, the amendment itself. Once the
measure is put to the vote, if it gains a majority, it is certified by the Election Board upon which the
measure takes effect.
30. Letter from W.A. Drew Edmondson, Okla. Att’y Gen., to M. Susan Savage, Okla. Sec’y
of State (June 4, 2010) (on file with author), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/
questions/755.pdf.
31. See generally MOHAMMED HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
(2003).
32. General Election Results, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD. (Nov. 12, 2010),
http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html.
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The election result precipitated a suit by Muneer Awad seeking to
enjoin the certification of the amendment. 33 Mr. Awad was granted a
preliminary injunction by the district court on November 22, 2010.34
The state then filed an appeal in December 2010, and the Court of
After receiving
Appeals heard the case in September 2011.35
supplemental briefs on the Establishment Clause issue, the court issued
its opinion on January 10, 2012. 36 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit issued a ruling upholding a preliminary injunction that prevented
the amendment becoming law. 37
While the decision will undoubtedly generate analysis of the
substantive and procedural constitutional issues, the case is interesting
for this article because the court recognizes both the lack of harm the
amendment seeks to prevent and the real harm that the architects of
these laws actually seek to inflict on Muslims. In dismissing the state’s
argument that Mr. Awad’s claim of being injured is a “personal
opinion,” the court posits “the harm alleged by Mr. Awad stems from a
constitutional directive of exclusion and disfavored treatment of a
particular religious legal tradition.”38 Analyzing the four factors
required for a preliminary injunction, the court applied the test found in
Larson v. Valente, 39 which applies when the state discriminates among
religions. 40 Rejecting the argument that the test did not apply, the court
opined that “legislatures seldom pass laws that make ‘explicit and
deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations.’”41 If a
law does so discriminate, it is subject to strict scrutiny. By singling out
shari’ah without mention of any other religious tradition, the law
certainly triggers Larson. 42 Moreover, the state’s argument that nations
and cultures should be read to mean other religions was dismissed by the
court:
The amendment bans only one form of religious law—Sharia law.
Even if we accept Appellants’ argument that we should interpret
cultures to include “religions,” the text does not ban all religious

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
Id. at 1301.
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1111.
See id. at 1298.
Id. at 1123.
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
Id. at 255 (applying strict scrutiny to laws that discriminate among religions).
See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
Id.
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43

As I argue below, the architects of these model laws are not preoccupied
with “whatever religions the legislature considered to be part of
domestic or Oklahoma culture,” only “other” laws and cultures. The
state’s position, therefore, is a distinction without a difference as the
court correctly surmises.
Having activated Larson’s strict scrutiny review, the state had to
defend the amendment by showing that it had a compelling interest in
passing the law and that the law was narrowly tailored to achieving that
interest. However, the state could not show any compelling interest, let
alone that the law was narrowly tailored. The single, vague statement
that is provided on this prong of the test is “Oklahoma certainly has a
compelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma
courts.” 44 No particular harm originating in the use of shari’ah is
forwarded by the state as evidence of a need for the law. There is no
“actual problem the challenged amendment seeks to solve.” 45 Upon
failing to show a compelling interest, the state could not survive strict
scrutiny. Even though it was not necessary to the inquiry because of
failure on the first prong, the court made the following observation about
the “narrowly tailored” prong of the test: “Even if the state could
identify and support a reason to single out and restrict Sharia law in its
courts, the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is hardly an
exercise of narrow tailoring.” 46 In effect, this is recognition of the
oversimplification and blanket condemnation of shari’ah in its entirety.
What is the real harm that the law inflicts on Muslims? In order to
obtain a preliminary injunction, Mr. Awad had to show that the harm to
him is irreparable. In appealing the lower court’s decision, the state
argued that Mr. Awad (and by extension all Oklahoma Muslims) would
suffer no harm if the injunction were denied (thus allowing the
amendment to take legal effect). 47 However, the court agrees that Mr.
Awad would, indeed, suffer an irreparable condemnation injury if the
injunction were denied. 48 Moreover, the balance of harms weighed in
favor of Mr. Awad, whose injury through the violation of his
constitutional rights would be graver than that of voters who “wish to

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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enact a likely unconstitutional” law.49 It is important to note here that
the state and the architects of the laws claim that there is no injury
suffered by Muslim citizens of Oklahoma when their state seeks to
enshrine into the state constitution an amendment that in effect
stereotypes and singles them and their sacred law out as a threat—recall
that the amendment is called “Save Our State.”50 Legally mandating the
outsider status of Muslims then amounts to nothing more than hurting
their feelings! And this condemnation should be borne in spite of the
fact that the state was unable to provide any examples of the necessity of
the law. 51
Regardless of the failure of the state in defending the law from
being temporarily enjoined, the state has vowed to continue to a trial on
the merits. 52 In the meanwhile, House Bill 1552 has been introduced in
the legislature following the ballot measure that prohibits use of foreign
law if it violates the rights guaranteed. 53 That bill, which makes no
reference to shari’ah, has passed unchallenged in the state legislature
thus far. 54
2. Arizona House Bill 2582
Arizona has already gained a measure of attention for its broadranging immigration reform bill that was enjoined by a federal court
almost immediately after passage.55 In this bill, Arizona follows other
states attempting to limit the laws that courts may apply in making their
decisions on the merits. Specifically, the bill states that:
A. A court shall not use, implement, refer to or incorporate a tenet of
any body of religious sectarian law into any decision, finding or
opinion as controlling or influential authority.

....
C. Any decision or ratification of a private agreement that is
determined on the merits, by a judge in this state who relies on any
body of religious sectarian law or foreign law is void, is appealable
error and is grounds for impeachment and removal from office.

49. Id.
50. Id. at 1117-18.
51. Id. at 1131.
52. Id. at 1137 (reaffirming the issuance of the temporary injunction).
53. H.B. 1552, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011).
54. Bill Information for H.B. 1552, OKLA. STATE LEGISLATURE,
www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=hb1552 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
55. H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. § 12-181(A), (C), (F)(3) (Ariz. 2011).
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....
F. 3. “Religious sectarian law” means any statute, tenet or body of law
evolving within and binding a specific religious sect or tribe.
Religious sectarian law includes Sharia law, Canon law, Halacha and
Karma but does not include any law of the United States or the
individual states based on Anglo-American legal traditions and
56
principles on which the United States was founded.

The bill forecloses the reliance on religious law to give meaning to
private agreements; however, it carves out marriages conducted in
religious ceremonies, and it also carves out law that is based on the
Anglo-American legal tradition or principles, much of which trace their
roots to English ecclesiastical law.57 Arizona’s bill expands the
prohibition to other faith communities, including Jewish, Catholic,
Hindu, and Buddhist communities whose laws can no longer be given
any effect in the courts.58 It departs from the Oklahoma provision by
including other religious law but is also consonant with it in including
international law or “foreign law.” 59
3. The Original Tennessee Senate Bill 1028
Tennessee has gained attention in recent years as the location of
one of the bitterest mosque-building disputes in the nation. Well before
the Park 51 controversy, the Muslim community in Murfreesboro,
Tennessee was embroiled in a campaign to prevent the building of a
mosque in the town. 60 While that controversy is still being resolved in
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Id. at § 12-181 (E).
58. Id. at § 12-181 (F)(3).
59. Id. at § 12-181 (C), (E)(3). It is interesting to note that Arizona also passed a bill
restricting the teaching of any subject that promotes resentment towards a race or ethnicity or
promotes racial solidarity. H.B. 2281, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010). While the bill is written
innocuously and seems to state the obvious, the intent behind it has been questioned by minority
groups. See, e.g., Nicole Santa Cruz, Arizona bill targeting ethnic studies signed into law, LA TIMES
(MAY 12, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/12/nation/la-na-ethnic-studies-20100512.
H.B. 2281 bans schools from teaching classes that are designed for students of a particular ethnic
group, promote resentment or advocate ethnic solidarity over treating pupils as individuals. The bill
also bans classes that promote the overthrow of the U.S. government.
The bill was written to target the Chicano, or Mexican American, studies program in the Tucson
School System, said state Supt. of Public Instruction Tom Horne. Id.
60. See Arson reported at Tennessee mosque construction site, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2010,
2:55 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2010-08-29-arson28_ST_N.htm. During this
ongoing conflict, Muslims in the town have had the site of the mosque vandalized, suffered arson,
and experienced threats to their safety. The opponents of the mosque have painted the mosque as a
possible venue for the recruitment of terrorists, a terrorist training center or a refuge for radicalism.
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the courts as of this writing, a new avenue of challenge has opened up.
In February 2011, Senator Bill Ketron from Murfreesboro, Tennessee
introduced a bill in the Tennessee Senate ostensibly to prevent support
for “shariah organizations.” The bill entitled the Material Support to
Designated Entities Act of 2011 was introduced into the Tennessee
Senate in February 2011 with a proposed enactment date of July 1,
Subsequently, Tennessee retreated62 from the specific
2011. 61
references to shari’ah, but examining the original text in order to
understand the genesis of the amended version and the true intent of the
bill that is no longer obvious from the current bill sheds light on the
motivations behind similar measures.63
In Section I of the original bill, the drafters laid out the general
purpose of the bill as a measure to counter a growing threat of terrorism.
The claim that was forwarded was that homegrown terrorism:
[I]s primarily the result of a legal-political-military doctrine and
system adhered to, or minimally advocated by tens of millions if not
hundreds of millions of its followers around the world. This legalpolitical-military doctrine and system is known as sharia to its
64
adherents, authoritative leaders, and scholars.

Having made the causal connection among millions of shari’ah
adherents, shari’ah, and homegrown terrorism, the bill continued on to
redefine shari’ah tautologically. 65 This redefinition essentially created
the basis of the rest of the law. The bill stated that “sharia as a political
doctrine” requires its adherents to overthrow the secular order and
establish a state governed by shari’ah. 66 It claimed that jihad is an
intrinsic and central feature of shari’ah and that shari’ah requires jihad
in order to establish itself through violent and criminal means, including

For a nationwide look at anti-mosque activity, see Map—Nationwide Anti-Mosque Activity, ACLU,
available at http://www.aclu.org/maps/map-nationwide-anti-mosque-activity (last visited, Jan. 24,
2013) [hereinafter “ACLU Map”].
61. S.B. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (effective July 1, 2011 as
2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 497).
62. The text of the new bill makes no mention of shari’ah at all, see supra note 23.
63. The bill, as it was amended, aligned more closely with anti-terrorism bills akin to the
PATRIOT Act. For amendments, see Bill Information for S.B. 1028, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY
available at http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB1028&ga=107
(last visited, Jan. 24, 2013).
64. S.B. 1028 at § (I)(39-13-902)(2).
65. Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(8). In this, we can read a sense of every Muslim who follows
shari’ah, that is, every observant Muslim, is a terrorist because their beliefs necessarily lead to
terrorism.
66. Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(4), (5).
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terrorism and “immigration-fed population growth.” 67 The law also
stated that the adherence to shari’ah constitutes “a conspiracy to further
the legal, political and military doctrine” that results in terrorism. 68
Under the law, knowing adherence to shari’ah provides “prima facie
evidence of an act to overthrow of the United States.”69 The bill allowed
the attorney general to designate groups as “sharia organizations” if they
are “two or more persons acting in concert in support of, sharia or
imposition of sharia” and they commit a terrorist act.70 Material support
for terrorists is included in the list of acts that qualifies as terrorism. 71 A
person found knowingly supporting a “sharia organization” would be
guilty of a criminal offense punishable by fifteen years in prison. 72
The Act in its original and even in its amended form is in essence
an anti-syndicalism measure and bears similarities to other national
security measures preventing material support for proscribed
organizations engaged in terrorism. However, its original aim was to
prevent the takeover of the state and U.S. government by Islamist
radicals engaged in a political struggle to establish an Islamic state in
the United States. 73 The rewritten version of the bill removes all the
references to shari’ah and looks like a generic anti-terrorism bill, 74 but
the original version gives us an opportunity to examine the historical
evolution of the specifically anti-shari’ah bills and how Muslims and
Islam are constructed, defined, and regulated by those proposing and
supporting these bills.
B.

The Architects of the New Threat

Legislative history and intent are important windows into the law. 75
In the analysis of the current anti-shari’ah and anti-foreign law
67. Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(6), (10).
68. Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(11).
69. Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(13).
70. Id. at § (I)(39-13-904)(2), § (I)(39-13-905)(a)(1)(B).
71. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-803(7)(A)-(B) (West 2013).
(7) “Material support or resources”:
(A) Means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, transportation, and
personnel; and
(B) Does not include medicine or religious materials
72. S.B. 1028 § (I)(39-13-906)(a)(1)(A), (B).
73. Id. at § (I)(39-13-902)(2), (8), (13).
74. H.B. 1353, 107th Gen. Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
75. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).
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measures, the writings and public declarations of drafters and proponents
is a critical source from which we can draw to understand intent and
meaning and also the intended effects of the law. 76 In other words, we
get a sense of what work the law is meant to do in our society. In this
section, I want to examine the intent of these laws by drawing primarily
from the public statements of their drafters and sponsors.
The bills that have been introduced into state legislatures have
common points of origin.77 They reflect a social movement to counter a
perceived threat of the encroachment of shari’ah in the United States. 78
Citing the use of shari’ah in the United Kingdom and the statements of
Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams that some forms of shari’ah
could be used in the state judiciary to settle cases there, the U.S.
opponents have made it clear that no such developments are welcome
here. 79 The anti-shari’ah movement has been active in supporting the
vigorous regulation of Muslims in general and this particular issue is a
spoke in a wheel of broader goals which I shall discuss in greater depth
in Part III. 80
In the wake of the Park51, the mosque that was to be built near
Ground Zero, 81 the latest legal effort at keeping Muslims in the margins
76. See generally Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance of English
Practice, 29 U. SAN FRANCISCO L.R. 1 (1994); see also, Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense
of Legislative History, 13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1267 (2005). In arguing for the use of
legislative history, McGreal states that:
I am not arguing that every scrap of legislative history has equal importance. As with
any other aspect of context, each piece must be weighed against the others to consider
how well it describes the overall context of enactment. The Supreme Court has done just
that in according different weight to different types of legislative history. For example,
the Court gives drafting history heavy weight, as it shows the different choices made in
crafting statutory language. Similarly, a legislator’s or committee’s explanation of a
“text’s pedigree” can offer guidance on interpretation, and a conference committee
report may shed significant light on a statute’s meaning.
Id. at 1298.
77. Andrea Elliot, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
78. Steinback, Jihad Against Islam, supra note 16.
79. George Neumayr, The Sharia-Compliant American Left, THE AM. SPECTATOR (Sept. 23,
2010, 6:08 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2010/09/23/the-sharia-compliant-american.
80. See infra notes 188-300 and accompanying text.
81. During this time, several mosque controversies also arose, although Park51 was the most
prominent controversy. The fact that mosque projects faced opposition in far-flung places such as
Murfreesboro, Tennessee and Sheboygan, Wisconsin indicates a broader disapproval. See ACLU
Map, supra note 60. Muslim communities attempting to build mosques have been vociferously
opposed on the grounds of traffic, parking, and crowding. However, as the controversies become
more heated, the fact that the opposition is based on a belief that these mosques will be breeding
grounds for terrorists becomes increasingly apparent. It is worth noting that those who have made a
stand against the building of mosques have gone beyond the legal arena to fight the threat. For
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has been these anti-shari’ah measures. At the forefront of this endeavor
are groups like Act! For America, Society of Americans for National
Existence (“SANE”); Stop Islamization of America (“SIOA”); and the
American Public Policy Alliance (“APPA”).82 Indeed, one person in
particular has been identified as the drafter of the model law that has
been the basis of a majority of the state enactments. He is linked with
SANE and the APPA, and although the model law says nothing about
shari’ah, the intent of the law is clearly stated on their websites:
“American Laws for American Courts was crafted to protect American
citizens’ constitutional rights against the infiltration and incursion of
foreign laws and foreign legal doctrines, especially Islamic Shariah
Law.” 83 Despite attempts to clarify the position on his website that the
law is not aimed at peaceful practice, the author of the bill makes no
attempt to distinguish what is meant by “peaceful” practice of Islam and
captures all of shari’ah as a threat to U.S. constitutional rights.84 There
is no attempt to explain what precisely is meant by “infiltration” or
“incursion,” suggesting by the use of these words that the courts are
eschewing U.S. law in favor of applying shari’ah! 85 Despite the
disclaimers in other venues, the website that offers the model law for
adoption makes clear that all of shari’ah generally, and consequently all
Islam, is a threat and, indeed, it is family law in particular that is
problematic. These views have found fertile ground amongst certain
politicians who have adopted the cause and moved it forward legally in
state legislatures and in the public discourse. For example:
Unfortunately, increasingly, foreign laws and legal doctrines—
including and especially Shariah law—are finding their way into US
court cases. Invoking Shariah law, especially in family law cases, is a

instance, in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the site of the mosque in question was set on fire, destroying
construction equipment. See supra note 60. As of this writing, there were mosque controversies
either ongoing or in the last decade in Tennessee, Oregon, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Maryland, New
York, Florida, California, and Mississippi. See ACLU Map, supra note 60.
82. Steinback, Jihad Against Islam, supra note 16; Robert Steinback, The Anti-Muslim Inner
Circle, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Summer 2011, available at http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/summer/the-anti-muslim-inner-circle;
Elliot,
supra note 77.
83. American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POLICY ALLIANCE,
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=38 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (emphasis added).
84. Press Release, Am. Pub. Policy Alliance, Spokesman Stephen M. Gelé statement
responding to CAIR-MI Attacks on American Laws for American Courts (Aug. 16, 2011), available
at http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=586.
85. SANE Staff, SANE: Backgrounder for Update Below: A Tale of Lies, Cries, and Demise,
SOC’Y OF AMS. FOR NAT’L EXISTENCE (Mar. 1, 2011, 2:33 PM), http://www.saneworks.us/
indexnew.php.
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means of imposing an agenda on the American people while
circumventing the US and state constitutions by using foreign laws
which do not recognize our constitutional rights and liberties in US
courts.
The potential impact of using foreign and international laws and legal
doctrines in US courts on the liberty of ordinary American citizens are
as profound as they are despairing. The embrace of foreign legal
systems such as Shariah law, which is inherently hostile to our
constitutional liberties, is a violation of the principles on which our
86
nation was founded.

A cursory review of the public comments made by other politicians
favoring anti-shari’ah measures and expressing suspicion of Muslims
reveals similar racist views. Recent Republican presidential candidate,
Herman Cain stated that he would not hire Muslims in his administration
in contravention of civil rights laws that prohibit employment
discrimination for religion. 87 Similarly, State Representative Rick
Wormick of Tennessee’s Rutherford County has said that Muslims
should not be allowed to serve in the military. In an email sent to a local
television station, he opines: “The question that is being asked is how do
we tell who is a devout Muslim who follows Sharia Law, versus a
Muslim who feels he can worship within the context of our first
amendment. The answer is, we cannot.” 88 The point I want to
86. Letter from Rosie Marie Swanger, Pa. Rep., to All H. Members, Pa. (June 14, 2011),
available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/CSM/2011/0/8559.pdf (emphasis added).
87. See Willoughby Mariano, PolitiFact: Herman Cain said more than once he wouldn’t hire
Muslims, TAMPA BAY TIMES, June 10, 2011, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/
national/article1174539.ece.
[A] blogger for liberal ThinkProgress.org questioned him:
“Would you be comfortable appointing a Muslim either in your Cabinet or as a federal
judge?” the blogger asked.
“No, I will not,” Cain replied. “And here’s why. There is this creeping attempt, there’s
this attempt to gradually ease sharia law and the Muslim faith into our government. It
does not belong in our government.”
Id.
88. Alan Frio, See Tennessee lawmaker defends anti-Sharia Law comments, WSMV (Nov.
13, 2011, 11:40 PM EST), http://www.wsmv.com/story/16030338/tennessee-lawmaker-defendsanti-sharia-law-comments. The politician whose comments at an anti-shari’ah conference were
reported in the news defended his views with the following:
In the e-mail sent to Channel 4 Nov. 13, Womick states, “[t]he question that is being asked is how
do we tell who is a devout Muslim who follows Sharia Law, versus a Muslim who feels he can
worship within the context of our first amendment. The answer is, we cannot.”
While Womick doesn’t paint every Muslim in the military as wanting to kill their fellow service
members, Womick makes it clear of his concern for Sharia Law.
“Sharia Law prohibits all Muslims from killing a fellow believer/Muslim, even if they are the
enemy,” said Womick. The penalty for doing so, says Womick, is hell. Id.
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underscore here is that the fear of Islam and “shari’ah creep” is not
simply confined to the social but is now an acceptable part of the
political ideology of a growing number of people who hold the keys to
public power. That political ideology drives these reforms, making law
its vehicle.
The broad stereotypes and assumptions about shari’ah in U.S.
courts are not supported by any facts. What is the agenda of the
individual litigants in a family law case or the courts adjudicating a case
involving shari’ah? The suggestion in the materials is imposition of
shari’ah on the entire citizenry. And how is this imposition to be
achieved?
III. FAMILY LAW AS FIFTH COLUMN: SHARI’AH CREEP IN U.S. COURTS?
The proponents of anti-shari’ah measures have also argued publicly
that these laws are necessary to preserve our national security. They
draw a connection between the cases in which shari’ah-based foreign
law is given comity in our courts and the erosion of the constitutional
protections and liberties. In short, the argument seems to run that if a
judge gives effect to a marriage or a divorce conducted under shari’ah in
a foreign country, he might in reality be opening the door to jihadist
ideology. That claim requires a leap of logic that cannot be sustained
unless one assumes that any and all shari’ah is jihadism and that giving
it any quarter is sliding down the slippery slope to a theocratic Islamist
state. Setting aside the concerns about terrorism, the effects of these
laws on precisely the doctrinal area of family law are likely to be quite
serious for individual Muslim litigants and other religious communities
should the laws be interpreted and applied as they are meant even if they
have no broader legal effect.
In this section, I evaluate the ways in which the courts have dealt
with shari’ah law in determining the cases before them in four areas:
marriage, divorce, child custody, and marital agreements. The cases
discussed below appear on a list that SANE cites as evidence of
shari’ah-creep in our judiciary. 89 But as I demonstrate, these cases do
not suggest the trend that anti-shari’ah groups claim and, therefore, do
not support the position taken by proponents of the anti-shari’ah laws.
Rather they show that the courts decide whether to give comity to
foreign judgments through the application of secular methods that work
without any need for additional laws prohibiting foreign laws.
89. See SANE Staff, SANE Email Update, vol. 6; no. 2, SOC’Y OF AMS. FOR NAT’L
EXISTENCE (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://www.saneworks.us/indexnew.php.
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Also as a prefatory matter, it is important to recall that the
Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land. 90 Moreover, courts routinely refuse to enforce or give comity to
laws from other jurisdictions and religious laws that conflict with the
public policy of the state.91 Taken together, there are finite thresholds
that foreign and religious laws may not cross if they contravene either
the U.S. Constitution or the forum’s public policy. 92
A. Marriage
Family law is one doctrinal area in the U.S. courts in which shari’ah
is periodically implicated.93 In marriages and divorces conducted in
different jurisdictions and private marital agreements that parties seek to
enforce in the United States, shari’ah rules are implicated through these
legal systems. However, this by itself has caused no problems until the
recent furor. As a general matter, when a marriage is conducted in a
country that operates under shari’ah, it is considered valid in the United
States unless it contravenes public policy. 94 For instance, in Islamic
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819)
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect
it would be this—that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result, necessarily, from its
nature. It is the government of all; it’s powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and
acts for all. Though any one State may be willing to control its operations, no State is
willing to allow others to control them. The nation, on those subjects on which it can act,
must necessarily bind its component parts. But this question is not left to mere reason:
the people have, in express terms, decided it by saying, ”this constitution, and the laws of
the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof,” “shall be the supreme law
of the land,” and by requiring that the members of the State legislatures and the officers
of the executive and judicial departments of the States shall take the oath of fidelity to it.
The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and
its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land,
“anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
91. See Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 500 (Md. 2008), Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d
230, 238 (Md. 1997).
92. See Aleem, 947 A.2d 489; Telnikoff, 702 A.2d 230.
93. The court never simply enforces shari’ah except by way of choice of law provisions that
are guaranteed as part of our freedom of contract. The other ways in which it is considered is
through the examination and application of foreign law, which might incorporate shari’ah.
94. The law of the place of celebration determines a marriage’s validity. See, e.g., Symeon
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countries that allow for plural marriages, all the marriages would be
legally valid. However, in the United States, polygamy is prohibited for
public policy reasons, resulting in the non-recognition of all but the first
marriage. 95
On occasion, a U.S. court has had to decide whether or not a
marriage is validly entered into. If the marriage has been conducted in a
jurisdiction that requires religious marriages, the court must inquire
whether the steps for formalizing the marriage have been completed. In
Nabil Taiseer Hassan and Sawsan Hassan v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., 96 the
court had to engage in this very inquiry. In that case, Nabil and Sawsan
Hassan, both Israeli citizens who had immigrated to the United States,
challenged their removal from the country by the Department of
Homeland Security. 97 Nabil Hassan had entered the country as an
unmarried child of U.S. citizen parents. 98 He then married Sawsan to
whom he was engaged. 99 Sawsan Hassan had entered the United States
on a tourist visa before her marriage. 100 The Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agent assigned to their naturalization case suspected that
they had been married prior to their entry into the U.S. and instituted an
investigation. 101 A marriage entered prior to entry would have vitiated
the grounds for his entry into the United States as a child of a permanent
resident and would make him removable. 102 Similarly, Sawsan’s status,
C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57
AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 310-313 (2009).
95. Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1985).
96. Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2010).
97. Id. at 917.
98. Id. at 918.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The government’s allegations were the following:
On May 23, 2002, the government served Nabil Hassan with a Notice to Appear
(“NTA”), alleging that: (1) he had married Sawsan before entering the United States; (2)
the marriage automatically revoked his visa under 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(I); and (3) he
was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) because he was actually an inadmissible
alien at the time of his entry into the country. Because Sawsan’s immigration status was
based on Nabil’s status, the government also issued an NTA to Sawsan alleging that she
too was removable for lacking a valid immigration visa. The government later added
two other charges of deportability to Nabil’s NTA, including that he was removable
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D) as an alien who falsely represented himself as a U.S.
citizen for any purpose or benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) or
any other federal or state law. This additional charge was based on an allegation that on
March 27, 2001 and May 16, 2001, Nabil falsely represented himself as a U.S. citizen on
a Small Business Administration loan application form. Petitioners denied the pertinent
allegations, including the claim that they had married prior to their entry in the United
States.
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dependent on her husband’s, would also be jeopardized.
The investigation required the government to ascertain whether the
Hassans had been married in Israel or in the United States.
The validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the place of
celebration. Matter of Luna, 18 I. & N. Dec. 385, 386 (BIA 1983).
Pursuant to Israeli law, the Sharia courts (and Sharia law) control
personal status matters of Muslims residing in Jerusalem. Matter of
103
Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308(BIA 1973).

Given that Israeli law states that religious laws of each religious
community govern family law matters, it would be impossible to
determine whether the marriage is valid without referring to shari’ah. 104
In this case, the immigration judge heard evidence from an Islamic cleric
to determine whether the marriage had been conducted in Israel. 105
Similarly, a court hearing a matter concerning an Israeli Jewish couple
under the same circumstances would rely on the testimony of a rabbi and
Jewish law to make the same determination because family law is, in
fact, religious law. 106 Yet, the proponents of the anti-shari’ah measure
emphasize the fact that the court relied on similar testimony about
shari’ah, implying the very mention of its use is an example of the
pernicious influence of shari’ah law in state courts.107
It is unclear what proponents of the anti-shari’ah measures would
suggest as the alternative to using foreign law in such a case. Would the
court be required to substitute alternative law, presumably U.S. state
law, as a neutral secular yardstick? And how would we apply such a
yardstick in legal and cultural context entirely foreign? The possibility
that longstanding marriages would be given no recognition is an
absurdity. In addition to those whose marriages have been solemnized
abroad, couples married in religious ceremonies within the United States
would also face a similar problem unless they can show that their
religious marriage conformed to civil standards. In most states, a
marriage requires two procedural elements: a license and a ceremony. 108
The state provides the license to marry, however, the ceremony can

Id.
103. Id. at 925.
104. Id. at 925 n.7.
105. Id. at 918.
106. S.A. v. K.F., No. XX/09, 2009 WL 212566, at *11 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 28, 2009).
107. Press Release, Am. Pub. Policy Alliance Spokesman Stephen M. Gelé, Gelé statement
responding to CAIR-MI Attacks on Am. Laws for Am. Courts, Am. Pub. Policy (Aug. 16, 2011),
available at http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=586.
108. Mitchell Waldman, Ceremonial marriage, AM. J. JURIS. § 13 (2011).
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either be secular or religious. 109 The result of enforcing laws that seek to
ban shari’ah in state courts may be a state-imposed secular ceremony.
While this may be acceptable to many, it is difficult to argue that
shari’ah could be singled out as a “foreign law” as the drafters of the
legislation seek to do: Hindu, Jewish, Catholic, and even some
Protestant ceremonies would also be suspect as they are “foreign”
imports. 110
B. Divorce
While entry into marriage may be relatively simple both
substantively and procedurally, divorce with its effects on property and
children, is far more complicated. Some forms of Islamic divorce have
been subjects of ongoing contention. The recognition of instantaneous,
extra-judicial and unilateral divorce as a male prerogative has been the
focus of much feminist activism within the majority-Muslim
countries. 111 This form of divorce allows a Muslim male to unilaterally
pronounce a divorce upon his wife and, thereby, dissolve the
marriage. 112 While some interpretations of this form of divorce have
attempted to restrict it, as it functions in many states, it is an unfettered
right, leaving Muslim wives vulnerable to arbitrary divorce. 113 Muslim
feminist activists have argued that this form of divorce is so abused that
it should not be recognized by the state.114 In the United States, courts
have refused to recognize such divorces because of these substantive and
procedural inequities that are well theorized and described by Muslims
themselves.
The procedural problems are well illustrated in Aleem v. Aleem. 115
In that case, Irfan Aleem and Farah Aleem had been married in Pakistan
in 1980 after which they moved to the United States. 116 The husband
was employed by the World Bank. They had two U.S. citizen children,

109.
110.
111.

Id.
H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. § 12-181(F)(3) (Ariz. 2011).
Ida Lichter, Misogyny in the Muslim World: Bound by Culture or Religion?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ida-lichter-md/misogyny-boundby-culture_b_803942.html.
112. Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 500, 501 (Md. 2008).
113. See, e.g., M.A. QURESHI, MUSLIM LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND MAINTENANCE
205-208 (1995).
114. See Manjari Mishra, Move to Counter Triple Talak, Halala, TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 8,
2011, 4:44 AM IST) http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-08/india/28667986_1_tripl
e-talaq-muslim-women-shaista-ambar.
115. 947 A.2d 489.
116. Id. at 494.
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and Mrs. Aleem was a permanent resident of the U.S. and a domiciliary
of Maryland. 117 When the relationship broke down, the husband went to
the Pakistani Embassy and executed a unilateral divorce of his wife,
Farah Aleem. 118 Subsequently, the substantial property which had been
accumulated during the marriage became a subject of controversy. 119
Their marriage contract was silent with regard to property settlement and
there was no premarital agreement. 120 Mr. Aleem argued that the
property should be settled pursuant to Pakistani law.121 Citing the lack
of due process afforded to the wife, the inequality of rights in divorce
between men and women in direct contravention to the Maryland Equal
Rights Amendment and Maryland’s public policy of preserving property
rights in absence of an agreement, the Maryland court refused to
recognize the divorce and apply Pakistani law to the property
distribution. 122 The court spent a great deal of its opinion on the issue of
comity. It explained that while foreign laws are to be given comity,
there are exceptions and limits to this general preference. If a law from
a foreign jurisdiction contravenes the public policy of the forum, a court
117. Id.
118. Id. at 490.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 491.
121. Id. at 490.
122. Id. at 500-501.
On November 7, 1972, the people of Maryland ratified the Equal Rights Amendment,
now found as Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. It provides “Equality of
rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.” Md. Const.
Declaration of Rights, art. 46. Accordingly, in the first instance, the enforceability of a
foreign talaq divorce provision, such as that presented here, in the courts of Maryland,
where only the male, i.e., husband, has an independent right to utilize talaq and the wife
may utilize it only with the husband’s permission, is contrary to Maryland’s
constitutional provision 13 and thus is contrary to the “public policy” of Maryland.
The talaq divorce of countries applying Islamic law, unless substantially modified, is
contrary to the public policy of this state and we decline to give talaq, as it is presented
in this case, any comity. The Pakistani statutes providing that property owned by the
parties to a marriage, follows title upon the dissolution of the marriage unless there are
agreements otherwise, conflicts with the laws of this State w here, in the absence of valid
agreements otherwise or in the absence of waiver, marital property is subject to fair and
equitable division. Thus the Pakistani statutes are wholly in conflict with the public
policy of this State as expressed in our statutes and we shall afford no comity to those
Pakistani statutes.
Additionally, a procedure that permits a man (and him only unless he agrees otherwise)
to evade a divorce action begun in this State by rushing to the embassy of a country
recognizing talaq and, without prior notice to the wife, perform “I divorce thee . . .”
three times and thus summarily terminate the marriage and deprive his wife of marital
property, confers insufficient due process to his wife. Accordingly, for this additional
reason the courts of Maryland shall not recognize the talaq divorce performed here.
Id. at 500-501, 502.
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may refuse comity. 123 Moreover, the Full Faith and Credit clause of
Article IV §1 of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to foreign
judgments; therefore, there is no automatic expectation of comity. 124
In Aleem, the court declined to give the law of Pakistan, which is
based on shari’ah, comity. 125 It did so because the application of that
law would deprive Mrs. Aleem of almost all the procedural protections
provided her by Maryland law, including the right to be heard on the
matter of the divorce. 126 As the court noted, prior decisions have made
clear that laws that contravene the public policy of the forum cannot be
afforded comity. What ought to be obvious is the necessary step
involved in order to ascertain whether Pakistani law ought to be given
comity. That is, the courts had to examine the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction and decide whether they conflict. Given that a large number
of majority-Muslim countries and even some non-Muslim countries, like
Israel and India, retain religious law in domestic relations, evaluating
these laws is not an uncommon occurrence. 127 However, application or
enforcement of that law is always restrained by public policy and the

123. Id. at 498.
124. Id. at 499.
125. Id. at 502.
126. It should be noted that ex parte divorces, where one spouse obtains a divorce decree in a
foreign jurisdiction without the appearance of the other spouse, are an ongoing practice in the
United States. However, most jurisdictions require that the non-appearing spouse be given notice of
the action, and in many cases, if the party is not resident of the jurisdiction or both parties did not
appear, comity is not afforded to the decree. See RANDY FRANCES KANDEL, FAMILY LAW,
ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 91-92 (2000). See also Divorce Abroad, TRAVEL.STATE.Gov,
available at http://travel.state.gov/law/family_issues/divorce/divorce_592.html (last visited Jan. 18,
2013).
A divorce decree issued in a foreign country generally is recognized in a state in the United States
on the basis of comity provided both parties to the divorce received adequate notice, i.e., service of
process and, generally, provided one of the parties was a domiciliary in the foreign nation at the
time of the divorce. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Under the principle of
comity, a divorce obtained in another country under the circumstances described above receives
“full faith and credit” in all other states and countries that recognize divorce. Although full faith
and credit may be given to an ex parte divorce decree, states usually consider the jurisdictional basis
upon which the foreign decree is founded and may withhold full faith and credit if not satisfied
regarding domicile in the foreign country. Many state courts which have addressed the question of
a foreign divorce where both parties participate in the divorce proceedings but neither obtains
domicile there have followed the view that such a divorce invalid. See Weber v. Weber, 265 N.W.
2d 436 (Neb. 1978); Everett v. Everett, 345 So.2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Kugler v. Haitian Tours,
Inc., 293 A.2d 706 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972); Estate of Steffke v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
222 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 1974); Commonwealth v. Doughty, 144 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958);
Bobala v. Bobala, 33 N.E.2d 845 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940); Golden v. Golden, 68 P.2d 928 (N.M.
1937).
127. See Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2010); Maddireddy v. Maddireddy, 886
N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
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laws of the United States. 128 Aleem v. Aleem is an example of the system
functioning as it should. The Maryland court required no statutory
guidance by way of an anti-shari’ah law to conclude that this particular
form of divorce seriously violates the rights of one party. It is difficult
to see how this case is an example of the infiltration of shari’ah as an
ideology into the U.S. judiciary. More importantly, while in this case
the anti-shari’ah or anti-foreign law provisions would provide a short cut
to the result, it would have entirely different results in ex-parte divorces
undertaken in foreign jurisdictions.
For instance, if Mr. Aleem had gone to Haiti and received a quick
divorce there and returned to the United States, his divorce would be
recognized as long as Mrs. Aleem had been given notice of the
proceeding. 129 Moreover, the U.S. courts would take jurisdiction over
property and child support matters and would have ongoing jurisdiction
over child custody matters. Given that Haiti’s law would be applied to
the divorce, in order to give it comity, the U.S. court would have to
consider 130 it and implement 131 it. Such reliance would appear to be
barred by the anti-foreign law measures.
C. Child Custody
Child custody matters in the United States require the ongoing
supervision of courts in order to ensure that children’s interests are
protected. 132 Under Islamic law, child custody follows what might be
construed as a combination of the “tender years” doctrine and the
Roman conception of patria potestas. 133 That is to say, that upon
divorce, children of a young age are left with the mother until they reach
a certain age at which time the father gains custody. 134 This rule differs
a great deal from the “best interest of the child” standard applicable in
U.S. courts. 135 Current standards no longer rely on a bright line rule that

128. See Sheldon Shapiro, Valid judgment of court of foreign country as entitled to
extraterritorial effect in federal district court, 13 A.L.R. FED. 208 § 5(a) (2011).
129. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 163-64.
130. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
132. See Kandel supra note 126, at 145, 157.
133. See Islamic Perspective on Child Custody after Divorce, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL,
http://www.islamic-sharia.org/children/islamic-perspective-on-child-custody-after-divorce.html
(last visited, Jan. 18, 2013).
134. See KUTAIBA S. CHALEBY, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 72-73
(Anas Al-Shaikh-Ali ed., 2001).
135. See Amin v. Bakaty, 812 So.2d 12, 28 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
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makes decisions on custody based on gender stereotypes. 136 Rather, the
best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. As a result,
child custody judgments from countries applying shari’ah laws or other
religious laws are subject to the public policy exception when it comes
to comity. Moreover, no custody judgment in the United States is final;
the determinations remain open to judicial review because of the state’s
interest in the welfare of children.137 Child custody judgments arrived at
in other countries are similarly open to revision by U.S. courts, including
those that rely on shari’ah.
A Louisiana court followed this well-established reasoning when
deciding Amin v. Bakhaty. 138 In that case, Mr. Bakhaty, a U.S. citizen
married Ms. Amin in 1991 in Egypt. 139 She gave birth to a son in
1992. 140 For six years, Ms. Amin lived in Egypt with the expectation
that at some time she and her son would relocate to the United States.141
Mr. Bakhaty, who had a medical practice in New York, traveled back
and forth to Egypt to visit the family. 142 After six years, Ms. Amin
relocated herself and her son to the United States and attempted to
contact her husband.143 Failing in this, she moved to Louisiana where
she had family. 144 When he discovered that his wife and son were in the
U.S., Mr. Bakhaty notified them that he would come to Baton Rouge to
meet them. 145 Instead, he traveled to Egypt to begin inquiries about how
his wife had managed to leave Egypt. 146 He then brought criminal
charges against her for removing the child from Egypt without his
permission. 147 She was convicted in absentia of these charges in
Egypt. 148
When Ms. Amin was informed of these actions, she filed suit
seeking a divorce, child custody, and support in the United States. 149
Almost concurrently, Mr. Bakhaty obtained a Certificate of Divorce

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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See Charara v. Yatim, 937 N.E.2d 490, 495 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).
See Overman v. Overman, 629 P.2d 127, 130 (Idaho 1980).
812 So.2d 12, 28 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 17, 23.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 20.
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from Egypt. 150 He then filed for a declaratory judgment of permanent
custody of the minor child. 151 Egyptian family law follows the millet
system in which one’s religious affiliation determines the applicable
law. 152 For Muslim Egyptians, shari’ah is applied, giving children of the
marriage to the father after they have achieved a certain age. However,
at the time that Mr. Bakhaty petitioned the Louisiana courts seeking
custody of the child, there were no outstanding orders issued by any
court. 153
In order to determine which court had jurisdiction over the child
custody and support matters, the Louisiana courts applied the Louisiana
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”) and the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act. At the trial level, the court declined to
recognize Egypt as a “state” under UCCJA and relied on the fourth
grounds of residual jurisdiction to take custody of the matter.154 Further,
it found that it had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Bakhaty because he
had availed himself of Louisiana courts and could, therefore, expect to
be haled into its courts. 155
Two questions arise from this case and its use in the SANE
document as an example of the inappropriate role of shari’ah. First, why
did the Louisiana court refuse to recognize Egypt as a state? Second,
does this case represent “shari’ah creep”? To answer the first, a brief
discussion of the international application of the UCCJA (or the
amended UCCJEA) is required. 156 The UCCJA was enacted to assist
courts in determining which state had jurisdiction over custody matters
when more than one state is involved. In cases where one of the
possible “states” is a foreign country, the act gives discretion to the
courts to treat that country as a “state.” In making that determination,
the courts examined the following factors:
(1) whether the child custody laws of the foreign jurisdiction and those of the United
States were similar, particularly in light of considering the best interests of the child;
(2) whether foreign custody decrees existed prior to initiating any proceedings in the
reviewing court;
(3) whether any of the parties were U.S. citizens; and
(4) whether the parties received adequate notice and a chance to be heard in the foreign

150. Id. at 18.
151. Id. at 13.
152. See generally Abu-Odeh supra note 12.
153. See Amin, 812 So.2d at 25.
154. Id. at 19; see also Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act of 1997, § 105, 201-203
[hereinafter “UCCJEA”].
155. See Amin, 812 So.2d at 22.
156. UCCJEA.
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157

Applying these factors, it is clear that both substantive (best interest of
the child) and procedural (notice and hearing) problems were present in
this case. Further, a U.S. citizen father went to a foreign jurisdiction for
the divorce and custody determination in a move that could be regarded
as forum shopping. The mother in this case did not flee the foreign
jurisdiction but rather came to the U.S. in an attempt to reunite with her
husband. Both parties were in the United States before the divorce was
initiated. At the time that Ms. Amin filed for custody, no judgment
existed determining who should take jurisdiction. Clearly, her move to
the United States was not made with the intention of evading the reach
of Egyptian courts. The assumption of jurisdiction by the Louisiana
courts was appropriate in this case. Moreover, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana was careful to note that not all cases involving countries with
codified Islamic law had the same result. Citing a number of cases, they
show that in some cases, foreign decrees are recognized while in others
they are not. 158 This tends to indicate that “shari’ah creep” is simply not
occurring.
In Hosain v. Malik, 159 for example, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland did give comity to a Pakistani custody decree.160 Pakistani
law is based on shari’ah. However, it includes consideration of the
welfare of the minor, a standard similar to the best interest of the
child. 161 Both standards give the courts broad discretion to make
decisions that benefit the child as opposed to upholding the rights of the
parents. In both jurisdictions, there is no dispositive factor that assures
one parent the custody of the child. Rather, a set of factors are
considered and weighed, including the child’s religion and agreements to
raise the child in a particular religion, his or her attachment to extended
family and the relationship with both parents. 162 The court stated:

157. Id.
158. CTR. FOR DEC. POLICY, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT
OF STATE APPELLATE COURT CASES 231 (Mar. 20, 2011) (citing Horlander v. Horlander, 579
N.E.2d 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Middleton v. Middleton, 314 S.E.2d 362, 368 (Va. 1984); Hosain v.
Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1000 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Rashid v. Drumm, 824 S.W.2d 497, 499
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Malak v. Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Ivaldi v. Ivaldi,
685 A.2d 1319, 1327 (N.J. 1996)).
159. 671 A.2d 988.
160. Id. at 1003.
161. Id. at 991.
162. See Kandel supra note 126, at 146; see also Hosain, 671 A.2d at 997 (discussing
Guardians and Wards Act of 1992).
The evidence was overwhelming that, as a general principle, Pakistan follows the best
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Significantly, this case is not about this Court undertaking the task of
acting as a fact finder in place of the circuit court or substituting its
judgment for that of the Pakistani court. And, this case is not about
whether Pakistani religion, culture, or legal system is personally
offensive to us or whether we share all of the same values, mores and
customs, but rather whether the Pakistani courts applied a rule of law,
evidence or procedure so contrary to Maryland public policy as to
163
undermine the confidence in the trial.

The Maryland court found that the Pakistani court had, indeed, applied
the welfare of the minor standard and that Ms. Hosain had been given
notice and an opportunity to be heard of which she failed to avail
herself. 164 Substantively, the preference given to fathers in Islamic law
(where it is a preference as opposed to a mandate) is similar to the
maternal preference that was common in U.S. courts well into the 1970s.
Moreover, statistics show that that preference is still at work. 165
Furthermore, the court recognizes that the law does not operate in a
cultural vacuum. In order to determine what the best interest of a child
is, the trial court must do so within the cultural context in which it
operates. So, if a parent’s morality is a factor to be weighed, that factor
can only be given meaning through the mores of the society in which the
factor is applied. 166 To argue otherwise would be to assert that there is
an objective morality or a neutral moral code that travels easily from one
interest of the child test in making child custody decisions. Both experts testified that
the Guardians & Wards Act of 1890 applies to child custody disputes. Section 7 of the
Act authorizes a court to appoint a guardian for a child where “the Court is satisfied that
it is for the welfare of a minor . . . .” GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT § 7 (1992). Section
17 of the Act, in pertinent part, states:
In appointing or declaring the guardian of the minor, the Court shall, subject to the
provisions of this section, be guided by what, consistently with the law to which the
minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor.
In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor, the Court shall have regard to
the age, sex and religion of the minor, the character and capacity of the proposed
guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, of a deceased parent,
and any existing or previous relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or his
property.
If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference, the Court may consider that
preference.
GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT § 17 (1992).
Id.
163. See Hosain, 671 A.2d at 997.
164. Id. at 1000.
165. See Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2001, U.S. CENSUS,
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-225.pdf (last visited, Jan. 24, 2013) (five
out of six custodial parents or approximately eighty-four percent were mothers).
166. See Hosain, 671 A.2d at 1000.
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location to the next and is knowable without any cultural baggage.
Acknowledging that the Pakistani court made its determination “utilizing
the customs, culture, religion, and mores of the community and country
of which the child and—in this case—her parents were a part” 167 is
stating the obvious.
Clearly, there is no special deference given to foreign laws based on
codifications of shari’ah, nor is there any particular discrimination
against those laws. Malik’s result is attributable to the Maryland court’s
recognition of substantive and procedural similarities in Pakistani law
that caused no conflict with Maryland law. Bakhaty, on the other hand,
was a much different case in which a U.S. citizen sought to apply
foreign laws that were at odds with Louisiana law. In matters of
custody, Egyptian family law relies on gender stereotypes about child
rearing and parentage in a way that U.S. law has attempted to move
beyond. 168 In the United States, a child does not “belong” to his or her
father’s family, nor does a mother automatically become the primary
custodian based on her gender. The primary consideration is the child’s
welfare. And it is permissible for a court to consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case before it makes its determination.
Consideration of religion, culture, the manner in which a child has been
raised, and the effects of change in a transnational dispute is essential. 169
Rather than being instances of the application of shari’ah, these cases are
prime examples of how the U.S. legal system works efficiently to
accommodate decrees from foreign jurisdictions while adhering to the
principle of supremacy of the laws and policy preferences of the United
States. It is an example of a system that works. If the anti-shari’ah
measures were implemented, such in-depth inquiry would certainly be
replaced in favor of the blanket assumption that all applications of
shari’ah fail to reach a just outcome.
D. Private Marital Agreements
Marital agreements, governed by contract law, are given more
deference in state courts regardless of their religious origin if it can be
shown that they conform to neutral contract law standards. As such,
mahr agreements (agreements for the payment of dower) that are part of
a Muslim marriage are put on the same footing as prenuptial agreements
167. Id.
168. Amin v. Bakaty, 812 So.2d 12, 25 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
169. See, e.g., Shauna Van Praugh, Religion, Custody, and a Child’s Identities, 35 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 309 (1997).
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or simple contracts and are typically given force.170 Dower agreements
memorialize the obligation to pay the wife consideration for entering the
marriage. 171 One common interpretation of this requirement is that it
provides financial security for the wife in the event that the marriage
fails. 172 The dower is separate property belonging to the wife alone, and
it is often the only property she received upon divorce. 173
One of the most prominent cases dealing with mahr agreements is
Odatalla v. Odatalla. 174 Zuhair Odatalla, the husband, challenged the
validity of the mahr agreement entered into at the time of marriage “on
two grounds: (1) the First Amendment to the Constitution precluding
this court’s authority to review the Mahr Agreement under the separation
of Church and State Doctrine and (2) the agreement is not a valid
contract under New Jersey law.” 175 The key issue was whether contracts
entered for religious reasons and pursuant to religious laws might be
enforced by civil courts. The problem that these religiously based
contracts present is that they may give rise to excessive entanglement if
the court is required to evaluate the religious principles underlying the
contract. However, as the court states in Odatalla, where there are
neutral principles of law that can be applied to evaluate the contract, the
civil courts may consider such contracts without violating the
Constitution. 176 Indeed, the enforcement of these contracts is a part of
the free exercise guarantee: “the Mahr Agreement is not void simply
because it was entered into during an Islamic ceremony of marriage.
Rather, enforcement of the secular parts of a written agreement is
consistent with the constitutional mandate for a ‘free exercise’ of
religious beliefs, no matter how diverse they may be.” 177
In order to settle the matter at bar, the New Jersey court examined

170. See Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), Aziz v. Aziz, 488
N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
171. Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts:
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L.
REV. 189, 199 (2002) (citing JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND
UNDER MODERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION 28 (1990)).
172. Chelsea A. Sizemore, Enforcing Islamic Mahr Agreements: The American Judge’s
Interpretational Dilemma, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1085, 1088 (citing Blenkhorn, supra, note 171,
at 210-11).
173. See Blenkhorn, supra note 171, at 201-202.
174. Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 2002).
175. Id. at 95.
176. Id. at 97. See also In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. 1990)
(recognizing marriage contract in Jewish marriage); In re Marriage of Bereznak & Heminger, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (enforcing binding arbitration in marriage contract).
177. Odatalla, 810 A.2d at 97.
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the contract that called for the immediate payment of one gold coin
(prompt mahr) and $10,000 in payment at a later time (deferred mahr)
and the evidence showing the parties entered into the agreement
freely. 178 In a videotape of the marriage ceremony, Zuhair gave the
bride, Houida, a gold coin “confirming his intention to be bound by the
Mahr Agreement.” 179 Zuhair’s arguments that the contract was
unenforceable because it was too vague, that it constituted a gift, or was
void for public policy reasons were unavailing. 180 Justice Selser
construed the agreement as “nothing more and nothing less than a simple
contract between two consenting adults.” 181 All the elements of a
traditional contract were present.
Mahr agreements have not always been upheld. However, similarly
the reasons for their unenforceability have had nothing to do with
religion but rather with their characterization. In Habibi-Fahnrich v.
Fahnrich, 182 the couple had been married for less than a year when the
marriage broke down. The Muslim wife sought to enforce the mahr
agreement which the parties agreed to: 1) a ring advanced and 2) half of
the husband’s property postponed. The court held that this agreement
was insufficiently precise because it failed the test “that anyone reading
the contract should be able to understand the dictates of the agreement.”
Moreover, there was insufficient evidence that both parties agreed to the
terms of the contract. 183 In Shaban v. Shaban, 184 a California court
found a mahr agreement unenforceable for similar reasons. In that case,
the mahr agreement was for a dollar at the time of marriage and about
thirty dollars in deferred mahr. At divorce, the wife claimed her share of
the community property of more than $3 million. The husband claimed
that the agreement meant that the wife had consented to the separate
property regime that is the default in Islamic divorce. However, the
court found that the agreement did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
178. Id. at 95. There are two types of mahr that can be agreed to at the time of marriage.
Prompt mahr is payable at the time of marriage whereas deferred mahr is payable at a later time or
on the occurrence of a particular event such as divorce.
179. Id. at 97.
180. Id. at 98.
181. Id. In an earlier Florida case, Akileh v. Elchahal, the trial court found that the mahr
agreement was not enforceable for lack of consideration. The holding was later overturned on
appeal. The appellate court found that marriage was sufficient consideration for the contract to be
valid. As a result, the wife was due the $50,000 agreed to in the agreement. See Akileh v. Elchahal,
666 So. 2d 246, 248-249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
182. Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 10,
1995).
183. Id. at *3.
184. In re Marriage of Sheban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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As Pascale Fournier has shown, U.S. courts apply a liberal-formal
equality approach to adjudicating mahr agreements:
[T]he secular conception of this religious institution: deprived of its
Islamic flavor . . . becomes a (Western) contract enforceable (or not)
irrespective of race, gender or religion. In capturing mahr under the
umbrella of Western contract law, as opposed to Islamic family law,
the judge pictures the liberal system as devoid of a representative role
for the Muslim-ness of the parties. Contract law, the judge assumes, is
185
not a matter of identity politics.

As such, at least in the adjudication of mahr as contract/prenuptial
agreement, religion is conspicuously avoided as a factor to be considered
in interpretation. The inquiry centers on whether the agreements meet
the criteria for a contract under common law principles rather than
shari’ah principles. Moreover, similar contracts are upheld when there
are no religious traditions or different religious traditions involved. 186 In
sum, these cases are also unpersuasive examples of shari’ah creep.
Rather, they are the opposite, they demonstrate the application of secular
law over religious law even where religious contracts are at the heart of
the controversy.
SANE and the proponents of anti-shari’ah laws assert that, through
family law and the accommodation of practicing Muslims in our judicial
system, shari’ah has gained a foothold and now threatens our
constitutional rights. These fairly straightforward family law cases are
cited in the SANE literature as examples of shari’ah creep that will
ultimately lead to an overthrow of our secular legal system. 187 For most
legal academics, such claims are clearly overblown political posturing
that can be easily ignored at least until they become law. Moreover, the
cases themselves do nothing to support such a claim. Rather they are
evidence of the sensible approach to comity developed over time by our
legal system. However, what ought not to be lost in the move to dismiss
these arguments are the social effects of these laws and the ongoing
construction of Islam as a threat to “our” way of life—even as mere
legal proposals or laws that ultimately fail—on Muslims.

185. PASCALE FOURNIER, MUSLIM MARRIAGE IN WESTERN COURTS: LOST IN
TRANSPLANTATION 90-91 (2010).
186. See, e.g., Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. 2005) (upholding the enforcement of a
prenuptial agreement); see also Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108 (1983) (enforcing a Jewish
ketubah requiring husband to submit to the Beth Din, a nonjudicial forum that would have no
impact on the civil divorce).
187. See SANE supra note 89.
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IV. THREATS TO NATIONAL IDENTITY OR NATIONAL SECURITY?
If anti-shari’ah measures are a solution in search of a problem, then
what is their true purpose? 188 How have these laws achieved the level of
support they enjoy? Does their ineffectiveness in preventing national
security threats make them nonetheless anodyne? What effects might
these laws have on the lives of ordinary Muslims? These are the
difficult questions that this section takes up. I contend that in large part
these legislative maneuvers are a reflection of a political and social
agenda that links the global terrorist “enemy” and all Muslims in the
United States and seeks to maintain the distribution of legal and social
power that prefers imagined “real” Americans.189 In other words, there
is an anxiety about identity, change, and “American-ness” threatened by
an increasingly diverse nation with more visible and powerful minority
individuals that has given rise to a retrenchment of dominant power. 190
Moreover, it is not simply an American phenomenon as the recent events
in Norway and the ongoing debates in Switzerland, France, and Holland
have shown. 191
In the case of the United States, two strands of analysis must be
undertaken to fully appreciate the legal and social import of these
laws. 192 The first strand is one that answers the methodology question:
how is the “enemy” constructed? I argue below that the creation of the
188. I take this phrase from Jamil Dakwar & Daniel Mach, Anti-Sharia Law: A Solution in
Search Of A Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2011, 2:55 PM ET),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/20/anti-sharia-law-a-solutio_n_864389.html.
189. This move is paralleled in the construction of Latino communities as outsiders and the
reemergence of racisms against African Americans particularly in the aftermath of the election of
Barack Obama and converges to form a concerted social, political and legal effort to circumscribe
the identity boundaries. See generally EDIBERTO ROMAN, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS: A
CLASSICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND CRITICAL RACE CRITIQUE (2010); see also RANDALL
KENNEDY, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL POLITICS AND THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY
(2011).
190. See Robert Steinback, Jihad Against Islam, supra note 16.
191. See John Esposito, Norway attacks a wakeup call for a world, WASHINGTON POST: ON
FAITH (July 30, 2011, 7:27 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/post/norwayattacks-a-wakeup-call-for-a-world/2011/07/29/gIQAZ4N4iI_blog.html. See also JOAN WALLACH
SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL (2007) (discussing the veil ban in France); Lorenz Langer, Panacea
or Pathetic Fallacy?: The Swiss Ban on Minarets, 43 VAND. J. OF TRANS. L. 863 (2010).
192. In Globalizing the Margins, I examined the ways in which the linkage works in one
direction, with the U.S. defining Muslims and Islam within its domestic borders, regulating Muslims
within these spatial boundaries. I recognized in that piece that the production and traffic of identity
and regulation is a two way street. I chose to focus on one direction—the local to the global. I must
thank Lama Abu-Odeh and Jorge Esquirol for reminding me of this linkage. See Cyra Akila
Choudhury, Globalizing the Margins: Legal Exiles in the War on Terror and Liberal Feminism’s
War for Muslim Women, 9 INT’L REV. OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 241 (2010) [hereinafter
“Globalizing the Margins”].
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enemy is an ongoing domestic attempt to confine and expel deceitful,
“dangerous” people and to define “real” Americans. It is an attempt to
draw the boundaries of identity tightly enough to clearly reject certain
undesirables from the community of people that national security law
seeks to protect. The domestic threat borrows heavily from a global
(re)definition of terrorists (that is then conflated with any Muslim as
potential or proto-terrorist) as “subhuman.” That definition revives old
colonial justifications for the application of special laws to the
“backward” races and their removal from the protection of “ordinary
law.” 193
The effects of the creation of the enemy are the second thread of the
analysis. This thread examines the real effects of these laws geared to
disciplining and expelling the enemy. The two strands brought together
provide a more robust account of the dissemination of Islamophobia and
the justifications for the need to regulate Muslims through law and
legalized violence. Moreover, they underscore the traffic between the
local and global in the War on Terror and both their intended and
unintended effects.194 It is also important to recognize the dialectical
relationship between some causes and some effects, whereby the effects
themselves reify the causes.
The purpose of examining these two strands is to call into question
the very definition and identity of the “enemy” and to highlight the costs
borne by those who are conscripted into this role. But it is not only the
travails of ordinary Muslims captured in the dragnet that concerns me, it
is also the distractions that these laws targeting minorities cause and the
damage they could do to more effective national security approaches. In
the following sections, I attempt to lay out some of the methods and
strategies by which the threat is constructed and their effects in both
local and global spaces.195
193. See generally Y.G.-M. LULAT, UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA: A
CRITICAL OVERVIEW FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE PRESENT 539 (2008); EDWARD SAID,
ORIENTALISM (1979); EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1994); Michael Brett,
Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The Senatus-Consulte of 14 July 1865, 51 BULL. SCH. OF
ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 440-461 (1988); see also Cheryl B. Welch, Colonial Violence and the
Rhetoric of Evasion: Tocqueville on Algeria, 31 POL. THEORY 235 (2003).
194. Some have argued that the core/periphery distinction that is upheld by borders has
collapsed. There is some evidence for this as the 9/11 Commission Report shows. See THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 517 (2004).
195. In the next section, I attempt to discover the strategies that are used to create the Muslim
as enemy followed by a discussion of the effects of those strategies in regulating the enemy. It is
not always possible to identify what is a cause and what is an effect; to some extent, the
construction of these as separate is artificial and can be contested.
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A. Methodology: Strategies in Creating the Enemy
There are numerous discursive strategies that can be used to
construct a national enemy. 196 Extensive research has been conducted
on propaganda and public dissemination of particular kinds of
stereotyping in order to bolster claims about a group that purportedly
threatens national identity and security. 197 From the turn of the last
century into the new millennium, such methods have been used to define
the Bolshevik threat, the Jewish threat, the anti-colonial or nationalist
threat, the integrationist/racial threat. 198 The “Muslim-as-terrorist-fifthcolumn” threat shares in this dismal history. 199 All of these have
commonalities in the way that they became national security threats. In
this section, I want to focus on three specific methods in the Muslim
context: assuming the power to redefine the values or beliefs of the
subject; stereotyping the subject; and finally, applying a set of “special”
laws that has the dialectical consequence of both creating and
maintaining the enemy.
1. Capturing the Discourse: Islam Resignified
Being able to represent oneself in one’s own words is critical to any
project of self-definition and emancipation. If the ordinary language that
a people use to give voice to their lives, values, and aspirations is twisted
and redefined, it makes expression of these difficult. The assumption of
the power to define is a classic tool in the arsenal of dominating powers
from the first colonizers until the War on Terror. 200 Increasingly, it has
become difficult for Muslims to use familiar terms with well-accepted
meanings to express ideas because of the way that these terms have been

196.

See EVA HERSCHINGER, CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL ENEMIES: HEGEMONY AND IDENTITY
33-59 (2011).
197. See SUSAN BACHRACH AND STEVEN LUCKERT, STATE OF DECEPTION: THE POWER OF
NAZI PROPAGANDA (2009); Richard Jackson, Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in
Political and Academic Discourse, 42 GOV’T & OPPOSITION: AN INT’L J. OF COMP. POL. 394-426
(2007); NOAM CHOMSKY, MEDIA CONTROL: THE SPECTACULAR ACHIEVEMENTS OF PROPAGANDA
(2002).
198. See supra notes 192-93.
199. See Yonat Shimron, Islamic Terrorism Threat May Be Overblown, Expert Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2011, 7:23 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/09/
islamic-terrorism-overblown_n_922757.html; John Esposito, Violent ‘Muslims’ distort the tradition,
WASH. POST BLOG (July 14, 2010, 9:27 AM ET), http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/
panelists/john_esposito/2010/07/violent_muslims_distort_the_tradition.html.
200. See generally EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 193, discussing the creation of
distorted knowledge about the “orient” by colonial experts who sought to understand the natives
that they were to govern).
IN INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSES ON TERRORISM AND DRUG PROHIBITION
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captured and resignified for political purposes.
A number of redefinitions are now in currency; for example, jihad,
which has had positive connotations as an internal struggle of spirituality
or a sanctioned external struggle against occupation, 201 has now become
synonymous with terror or anti-Western violence. 202 Indeed, it has
spurred the creation of a set of neologisms such as jihadist and jihadism
to complete the resignification of the term into a synonym for terror.203
Similarly, Madrassa has gone from simply meaning “school” to
indoctrination center where children are taught to hate the West and
wage jihad. 204 The educational programs in any school in the United
States or anywhere else can be radically delegitimized by simply calling
them madrassas, carrying with it the implication that these are jihadi
training centers. 205 These are perhaps the most obvious and common
examples of words resignified. But increasingly, ideologues are
resorting to the Internet and relying on the newly redefined terms coined
by those with little or no knowledge of Islam or its jurisprudence. These
self-appointed gatekeepers have begun to capture more concepts,
decontextualizing them and redirecting their meanings. 206 Below are
some examples of this trend.
Dhimmi meant “protected peoples” in Islamic societies; the
concept, long dead after the rise of the state and the experience of
colonization and secularization, has been revived to provide support for
the idea that non-Muslims are discriminated against in Islam. 207 Hence,
201. DAVID COOK, UNDERSTANDING JIHAD 32-48 (2005).
202. It has even spurred the creation of neologisms like “jihadi” or “jihadism.” See, e.g.,
“Jihadist,” MIRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/jihadist (last visited, Jan 19, 2013).
203. Roxanne L. Euben, Jihad and Political Violence, CURRENT HIST., Nov. 2002, at 365-366.
204. See generally Peter Bergen & Swati Pandey, The Madrassa Scapegoat, 29 WASH. Q. 2,
115-125 (2006).
205. The Khalil Gibran School is a prime example of this “smear” campaign where the
madrassa label was used to delegitimize the enterprise. Of course, to a person for whom the term
has no particular meanings, the label would be utterly senseless—there is nothing offensive about
calling a school a school after all. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
206. For a sample of these websites, see, e.g., DANIEL PIPES: MIDDLE EASTER FORUM,
http://www.danielpipes.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2013); ISLAM-WATCH.ORG, http://www.islamwatch.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2013); JIHADWATCH.ORG, http://www.jihadwatch.org (last visited
Jan. 19, 2013).
207. The appropriation of this term suggests that “dhimmitude” was an ongoing burden on
non-Muslims erasing a complicated history of minority status within existing empires. While it
cannot be denied that non-Muslim minorities were treated differently by the state, it is equally true
that different ethnicities were treated differently by dominant ruling powers like the Ottomans.
Moreover, after the introduction of capitulations, some minorities were given even greater
protection than that of the “native;” they could essentially place themselves under the protection of
external states like the French and the British. Further, it is important to point out the double
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the newly minted neologism dhimmitude now negatively denotes the
status of dhimmi not as a protected class but as a subordinated class
within a modern state. 208 An Islamic state, according to this thinking, is
incapable of treating all groups equally because it requires non-Muslims
to assume a second-class status. 209
The term taqqiyya, which had been uncommon, is increasing in
popularity. Taqqiyya is a practice that allowed Shi’a Muslims to
dissemble about their religious affiliation when under attack for being
Shi’a and persecuted by Sunnis. It has been reinvested with the meaning
that Muslims may lie at will to deceive non-Muslims. Thus, the
redefined practice is now cited to support the belief that nothing a
Muslim says can be taken at face value or as truth. The religion requires
pathological mendacity. The result is that no defense or assertion of a
Muslim’s good faith is believable because by definition, Islam requires
Muslims to lie to non-Muslims. 210 This redefinition is perhaps the most
pernicious and racist because it captures Muslim in a loop—no amount
of explaining, disavowing of the “wrong” beliefs or professing of the
“right” ones is satisfactory because the Muslim is a liar and, therefore,
anything she says is immediately dismissed as an attempt to hoodwink
the unsuspecting.
The Tennessee law as it was originally proposed provides perhaps
the most overt and startling example of the power to resignify Islam in a
way that suits the dominant anti-Muslim discourse. In this document,
shari’ah is redefined to mean a militaristic ideology and religion that
supports violence to achieve an Islamic state.211 This particular
redefinition is most alarming because it makes two seemingly
standard often employed by those using the term “dhimmitude.” While they charge Muslim
empires, which were monarchic and made no claims to Liberal ideas of rights, with treating their
minorities as second class citizens, they seem to overlook European empires that were willing to kill
their subjects—let alone citizens, second class or otherwise—en masse as readily as the Ottomans.
As for the modern period, it is arguable that most states with homogenous populations treat their
minorities as second-class citizens, the United States’ history in this regard is nothing of which to be
proud. See AARON KLEIN, SCHMOOZING WITH TERRORISTS: FROM HOLLYWOOD TO THE HOLY
LAND, JIHADISTS REVEAL THEIR GLOBAL PLANS—TO A JEW! 9-10 (2007).
208. See generally BAT YE’OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM (1985);
Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural
Relativism, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 1-18 (1987). But cf. Nasim, The concept of Al-Dhimmah and the
rights and duties of Dhimmis in an Islamic state, 9 J. INSTITUTE OF MUSLIM MINORITY AFFAIRS 2,
217-222 (1988).
209. See KLEIN supra note 207, at 19.
210. See Boura, Islamic Tactics of Taqqiya teaches Muslims to practice Deception, Fraud &
Double Standards to Spread Islam, DANIELPIPES: MIDDLE EAST FORUM (Nov. 9, 2006, 22:11),
http://www.danielpipes.org/comments/65699.
211. See supra note 61 (describing the original Tennessee law).
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conflicting moves: first it reduces Islam to a political ideology akin to
communism. The adherents of the religion become analogous to
political ideologues who must be convinced of the error of their
pernicious beliefs. Islam’s relevance as a religion is diminished.
Second, it totalizes that construction to create a group of adherents
whose every action can be explained via their Muslim identity. Islam as
a politics drives all. To put it another way, Islam as a religion that does
not dictate all political commitments but rather, like all religions,
competes with other important markers of identity such as gender,
sexual orientation, ethnicity, linguistic affiliations, and geography in a
dynamic and complex way is radically oversimplified and totalized. As
such, the law cannot be seen as merely an anti-syndicalism measure and
dismissed as having no real effect on “good” Muslims. There is far
more going on here than the equation of Islam to communism and as I
argue below, it is questionable whether there is any possibility in reality
of a “good Muslim.”
2. Creating an Identity: Muslim Propensities
Having captured the vocabulary of Islam and resignified it, these
anti-shari’ah laws also reflect a particular opinion of Muslims. What are
the traits of a Muslim who chooses to, as Pennsylvania Representative
Swanger puts it, “embrace Shariah law, which is inherently hostile to our
constitutional liberties?” 212 This view makes these choices mutually
exclusive. 213 If shari’ah has been defined as inherently hostile to the
liberties guaranteed in the Constitution, anyone who continues to follow
the former must then be a threat to our political and legal order. This
construction of identity in which religious Muslims inevitably choose
religion as their politics may result in a particular kind of subject, but
that subject is further fleshed out by adding premodern attributes. The
result is that Muslims are demarcated as essentially different from “real”
Americans.
Muslims have long been the objects of stereotyping like other
groups. A large literature already exists of colonial constructions of
race. 214 Here, I want to simply add that in the War on Terror, which
212. See supra note 86.
213. Note that because of the resignification of taqqiyya, no amount of repudiation of violence
or support for jihadism, or rejection of political Islam serves to quiet the anxiety of the
Islamophobe. All such attempts are reinterpreted as lies told to non-Muslims because of taqqiyya!
The circular reasoning results in the view of all Muslims as pathological liars who then by definition
cannot signify themselves.
214. See, e.g., SAID, ORIENTALISM AND SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 193;
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includes our domestic national security measures, “Muslim” as an
identity prescribed by the dominant discourse has taken on the attributes
of a number of other groups that came before. But it is also unique in
that it already had a negative history to which more could be added. For
instance, Muslims are not the first group to be considered a threat to
national security, and they are certainly not the only group against whom
the law has been used as a weapon. 215 As numerous scholars have
pointed out, Japanese Americans and German Americans have also been
stigmatized when the United States has been at war. Certainly, the
renewed calls for loyalty oaths and even internment simply rely on
previous actions taken to secure the homeland.216 But the character of
Muslims as violent, terroristic, and hateful of “our way of life,”
oppressive to women, lascivious and venal, mendacious, and incapable
of entering modernity (read leaving a medieval religious sensibility
behind) makes them quite unique.217 Few modern stereotypes have
antecedents in the Crusades. 218 The more current attributes of
Muslimness are cobbled together from readily available stereotypes of

Ian F. Haney-Lopez, The Social Contruction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,
and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994); Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as
Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical
Perspectives on the Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16 (Jan. 2005).
215. See Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of Japanese Internment
in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN L. REV. 307 (2006); Natsu Saito Taylor, Internments, Then &
Now: Constitutional Accountability in Post-9/11 America, 2 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 71 (2010).
216. Id.
217. JACK G. SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES A PEOPLE 12-14
(2001); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of
States in U.S. Immigration Policy: Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11,
2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 304 (2002); see
Jeremy Clutchy, Imus anchor on Palestinians: “Stinking animals. They ought to drop the bomb
right there, kill ‘em all right now” MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Nov. 19, 2004, 6:22 PM EST),
http://mediamatters.org/items/200411190009.
MSNBC’s Imus in the Morning offered derisive, racist commentary about Palestinians
during the November 12 funeral of deceased Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat.
Regular Imus guest and sports anchor Sid Rosenberg referred to Palestinians as “stinking
animals” and suggested: “[t]hey ought to drop the bomb right there, kill ‘em all right
now.”
On November 19, the program broadcast a radio segment featuring a guest—parodying
General George S. Patton, Jr.—who said that the recent report of a U.S. Marine shooting
an unarmed, injured Iraqi insurgent provided the enemy “with another cozy ‘al Jazeera
moment’ for the Muslim masses to respond to with their routine pack-of rabid-sheep
mentality.” The guest also referred to a deceased Iraqi insurgent as “a booby-trapped
raghead cadaver.”
218. See, e.g., SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, supra note 193. For a history of the
Crusades from the Arab and Middle Eastern perspective, see generally AMIN MALOUF, CRUSADES
THROUGH ARAB EYES (1989).
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Muslim males in particular from various locations: the Saudi patriarch,
the Palestinian terrorists, the Pakistani double-dealer, the Afghan zealot,
and the Egyptian or Iraqi Muslim-supremacist intent on sectarian
violence. 219 When put together, the proverbial nightmare monster of
“normal” people’s dreams is realized—a thing inhumane and subhuman. Muslim women are reduced to the trope of the sexually
oppressed, burka-wearing silent ghosts constantly threatened with honor
killing and too oppressed to even speak. 220 The Muslim is a person
steeped in culture and religion. As such, all actions they undertake are
driven by this premodern sensibility. 221
A clear example of this sort of stereotyping can be seen in a recent
op-ed by Richard Cohen of the Washington Post. 222 The column was
219.
220.

See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
See generally Scott supra note 191; see also WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION:
TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 60-66 (2008).
221. Id. In the media, when a Muslim commits an act of violence, the deterministic script
deployed tells us that he or she was driven by Islam. Moving to Islam and the conflation of religion
and politics (obscuring politics) results in the obscuring of the primarily political bases for Muslim
violence and also obscures U.S. violence against Muslims abroad. Take for instance, the treatment
of Virginia Tech shooter, Cho Seung-hui, as compared to Army psychologist, Nidal Hasan. In the
case of the former, his mental health was the determining factor for his actions. His Koreanness or
ethnicity was not a motivating factor. On the other hand, Major Hasan’s actions were construed as
being driven by his Palestinian origins and his Muslim identity while his mental health is treated far
less seriously as a motivator for his actions. Muslims are not even capable of “madness” or mental
disease unless it has something to do with religion. I use this example to underscore that a variety
of factors are at play in any violent incident. In the case of Muslim perpetrators, it is Islam that is
given the most weight while other perhaps more salient variables are downplayed. See also Daniel
Engber, Is There a Lot of Crime on Military Bases? Not as much as you’d think, SLATE (Nov. 5,
2009, 8:28 PM ET), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/11/
is_there_a_lot_of_crime_on_military_bases.html; Arment Keteyian, U.S. Army Base Has Bloody
History, CBS EVENING NEWS WITH SCOTT PELLEY (Nov. 5, 2009, 5:15 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/05/eveningnews/main5541051.shtml?tag=contentMain;co
ntentBod; see also Lauren Cox, Fort Hood Motive Terrorism or Mental Illness?, ABC NEWS (Nov.
9,
2009)
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/fort-hood-shooters-intentions-massmurder-terrorism/story?id=9019410#.Tu9thdWwVT8.
222. See Richard Cohen, Post Opinions: Enough of Rick Santorum’s sermons, WASH. POST
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/enough-of-rick-santorums-sermons/2012
/02/27/gIQAvUKieR_story.html.
The tendency to focus on the religious or cultural explanation is also evident in the reporting of an
attack thwarted by law enforcement in July 2011. In those attacks, Yonathan Melaku was
apprehended outside the Pentagon with bomb-making materials in his backpack and evidence that
he wanted to engage in violent jihad. The Washington Post reports that “[l]aw enforcement sources
said that it was unclear what religion Melaku follows and that they were investigating that aspect of
his life; leaders at the mosques near his home said they did not know Melaku or his family.”
Looking for a motive in religion and interviewing mosque leaders reinscribes the well-worn script
that religion motivates these attacks. Searching for religious identity then becomes important.
Moreover, self-profession without any knowledge of Islam is enough to create the causal link. In
other words, Melaku can shout “Allahu Akbar” and profess to be a Muslim without knowing
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not about Muslims at all but about Rick Santorum, a contender for the
Republican nomination.223 Commenting on the controversy raised by
Santorum’s claim that the separation of church and state makes him sick
and his belief that there should not be an impermeable barrier between
the two, Cohen starts with the following:
Mullah Rick has spoken.
He wants religion returned to “the public square,” is opposed to
contraception, premarital sex and abortion under any circumstances,
wants children educated in what amounts to little red schoolhouses and
called President Obama a “snob” for extolling college or some other
kind of post-high school education. This is not a political platform.
224
It’s a fatwa.

He goes on to discuss Santorum’s various problems with secularism and
higher education, women’s rights and the prevalence of religion in the
public square. He ends with this:
But when I mull Santorum’s views on contraception, the role of
women, the proper place for religion and what he thinks about
education, I think he’s either running for president of the wrong
225
country or marooned in the wrong century. The man is lost.

Whatever one’s opinion of Rick Santorum, the link between his views
and Islam is deftly made in the first line. The stereotype at work here is
that Muslim clergy are regressive and hold political positions that
support the oppression of women and that are anti-modern. Moreover,
misusing (and resignifying) the term “fatwa,” Cohen asserts that Rick
Santorum has issued one by calling Obama a snob. And, in case the
reader had forgotten that Santorum’s views are more in line with a
backward Muslim clergy, he ends with the allusion that Santorum
anything about Islam and having no ties to Muslims and yet Islam is purportedly the motivator for
his actions. See Josh White & Allison Klein, Pentagon shooting suspect not known to officials,
WASH. POST, June 23, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pentagon-shootingsuspect-not-known-to-law-enforcement/2011/06/23/AGniB8hH_story.html (emphasis added).
A Google search of the string “Yonathan Melaku Muslim” results in a plethora of websites many of
which demand to know why the news agencies failed to report that Melaku was a Muslim. Others
point out that there is no evidence that he is a Muslim, while others simply assume that he is. See
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=yonathan+melaku+Muslim&ie=UTF8&oe=UTF-8 (last visited, Jan. 19, 2013). It should be noted that anyone can convert to Islam with
relative ease. This makes it difficult to disavow them as a Muslim despite the fact that they may not
be part of a larger community of Muslims.
223. See Cohen, supra note 222.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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rightfully belongs in another country (read Iran). Suffice it to say that
the position of Muslim clergy on any subject is multifarious; after all,
there is no central religious authority akin to the Pope who speaks for
them all. Yet, the less obvious stereotype at work here is the clearly
erroneous vision that white, educated, heterosexual men cannot have
these kinds of views without it being some sort of (Islamic-tainted)
aberration. It’s normal for Muslims, but abnormal for Santorum and his
ilk. There are no descriptors aside from Islamic one’s like “mullah” and
“fatwa” to describe him. In other words, even when homegrown
religious fundamentalists hold premodern positions that liberals disagree
with, the terms used to describe them are ones that reify the stereotypes
about Muslims. We talk about them as though they were part of an alien
population rather than entirely American examples of religious
fundamentalism.
A more startling example of the stereotype substituting for real
analysis comes from the shootings and bombing in Norway in 2011.
Anders Breivik, a self-defined nationalist, perpetrated the worst terrorist
attack on Norway to date driven by the kind of ideology that members of
SANE and PPA disseminate. 226 His manifesto quotes liberally from
groups directly related to the anti-shari’ah measures. 227 Yet in the early
hours of the incident, the blame was squarely placed on Muslims,
reinforcing the view that only Muslims do this kind of violence. 228 The
incident was reminiscent of the U.S.’s experience with the Oklahoma
bombing. Such rushes to judgment have serious consequences for both
Muslims and our national security. As others have argued before, this
blinkered view of the “enemy” prevents us from seeing the threat posed
by a variety of quarters. 229
This move to conflate Islam and politics allows for a flexible
strategy where Islam as politics is something that can be shed by
Muslims; they can choose to become “capitalists” or proponents of
democracy. At the same time, it is also inescapable because it is a
226. Chris Rodda, Writers Cited in Breivik Manifesto Have Spoken at U.S. Military Colleges
as Anti-Terrorism Experts, HUFFINGTON POST (July 28, 2011, 12:00 PM ET),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-rodda/writers-cited-in-breivik-_b_910407.html;
see also
Robert Mendick, Norway Massacre: the real Anders Behring Breivik, THE TELEGRAPH, July 31,
2011 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/us/politics/11king.html; Anders Breivik,
2083: A European Declaration of Independence (2011), available at http://unitednations.ispnw.org/
archives/breivik-manifesto-2011.pdf.
227. Breivik, supra note 226.
228. Raja Abdulrahim, Muslims feel initial sting of blame, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2011,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/23/world/la-fg-norway-blame-20110724.
229. Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes, & Tara Lai Quinlan, Defining Racial Profiling in
a Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195 (2003).
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religion and therefore integral to identity; it is part of the essence of
Muslims. The conflation allows the anti-shari’ah proponents to both
charge Muslims with choosing to follow Islam and to construct them as
inevitably driven by religion that cannot be shed. The Muslim is a
subject that is both political, choosing to follow the ideology of Islam
and religious, unable to choose but infused with religious or cultural
sensibility.
The subject can only escape the ideology through
conversion (see Chart 1 below). This opens up a number of avenues for
regulation based on politics and religion both locally and globally. 230
Chart 1: Categorizing Muslims in the United States

UNITED STATES
Good Muslims/U.S.
Patriots/Reject Shari’ah/Leave
Islam/Criticize Islam
To be accepted as a
“real” American,
Muslims
must reject adherence to
shari’ah
U.S. Muslims following Shari’ah
[Assumption: shari’ah/Islam
results in particular political
beliefs]
Refusal to disavow
shari’ah results in
categorization as
Other/Un-American
PERIPHERY
Terrorists/ Adhere to
Shari’ah/Defend Islam/Criticize
U.S.
230. It should be made clear that, while I critique those in the United States who reduce
Muslims to their religious identity, I do recognize some Muslims’ invocation of Islam even when
acting for non-religious, political reasons has complicated matters. The history of the use of Islam
as a political vernacular is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth noting that a more
nuanced analysis of motivations is needed to go beyond the shallow view that Islam, as a religion, is
the driving force for all violence. In other words, the view that “they did it because of their
religion” is facile, reductionist and explains very little.
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3. Applying the Rule of (Which) Law?: National Security v. Civil
and Human Rights
I have argued above that redefining Islam and Islamic terms so that
they can no longer be used in their ordinary sense and the construction
of a capacious Muslim stereotype (carried forward from history and
added to in the present) are two strategies that work to create a
comprehensible, identifiable enemy. In this section, I want to briefly
touch upon the way in which law itself can play into this creation. The
application of a particular set of laws primarily to Muslims is both a
cause and an effect of the construction of the enemy. Insofar as the
global War on Terror and national security are primarily constructed
around the problem of Islamist terrorism after 9/11, Muslims are their
object. The laws are both an effect of a real set of circumstances (terror
attacks) and a cause in that they constantly create the subject of a
Muslim identity repetitively linked to terror. Furthermore, the national
security discourse subsumes human rights and civil rights under the
superior claim of security. That is precisely why calls for the respect of
Muslim citizens’ civil rights are largely unpersuasive in the social
arena—the discourse creates a constant threat which must be answered
by regulating Muslims. 231 It is easy to sacrifice the civil rights of a
small, disfavored minority and to subject them to differential legal
treatment for the purported security of the greater population.232
For instance, the proponents of anti-shari’ah laws seek to exclude
Muslim citizens from “normal” law because these Muslims who follow
shari’ah have no commitment to that law. That is to say, they eschew
the Constitution and American civic values.233 Indeed, by clinging to a
hostile religio-political law, an ideology rather than a faith, they remove
themselves from the protections of civil rights. 234 Thus, the promise of
231.

SHADI MOKHTARI, AFTER ABU GHRAIB: EXPLORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICA AND
105 (Chris Arup, et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
232. See Gruber supra note 215 (discussing Japanese internment).
233. See Globalizing the Margins, supra note 192.
234. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE COLD WAR
AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR 18-23 (2004). Mamdani explores the lack of politics as an explanation
of their actions or beliefs:
In the post-9/11 America, Culture Talk focuses on Islam and Muslim who presumably
made culture only at the beginning of creation, as some extraordinary, prophetic act.
After that, it seems Muslims just conformed to culture. According to some, our culture
seems to have no history, no politics, and no debates, so that all Muslims are just plain
bad. According to others, there is a history a politics, even debates, and there are good
Muslims and bad Muslims. In both versions, history seems to have petrified into a
lifeless custom of an antique people who inhabit antique lands. Or could it be that
culture here stands for habit, for some kind of instinctive activity with rules that are
THE MIDDLE EAST
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equality before the law (where laws that apply are fairly administered)
does not translate into the equality of laws that apply to Muslims. The
threat that they pose using the liberal laws of the land to infiltrate and
subvert secular order require particular responses. Anti-shari’ah laws
then can be read as a means of foreclosing the access to legal techniques
like those of comity and conflicts of law in our system that are means by
which inherently destructive laws like shari’ah infiltrate.
While these laws do little to protect the homeland because they are
aimed at an imaginary threat (shari’ah creep), they do have a
commonality with national security laws insofar as they single out
Muslims for special treatment. They continually remind us that we can
never let down our guard or vigilance. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to examine all the specialized laws that apply in depth, but a brief
recounting of some of these regulations is warranted here to make the
case that there is a concerted effort at discriminating against Muslims
underway.
Before the War on Terror, racial profiling had become a disfavored
approach to policing. 235 The use of race as a proxy for criminality was
rejected for both its racism and its inefficacy. 236 However, after 9/11,
erstwhile critics of the practice changed their positions to call for the
profiling of Muslim/Arab-looking people to prevent another attack. 237
The result has been a net failure. Few prosecutions were undertaken
after the 9/11 sweeps in which most people who were captured were
violators of immigration laws, not terrorists. Further, people who are not
Muslim have been captured because they are visibly different from
“real” Americans. In the meanwhile, the races of people that have been
captured and prosecuted for terrorism include White, Latino, Black,
South Asian, and Arab, giving the lie to any belief that terrorists can be
visibly identified. By that logic, a terrorist seems to look like anyone
caught doing terrorist acts!
Along with profiling has come heightened surveillance, including
Periodic
surveillance without warrants and probable cause. 238
inscribed in early founding texts, usually religious, and mummified in early artifacts?
Id. at 18.
235. See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 34-41 (1999); See Ramirez, supra note 229.
236. Cole, supra note 235; Ramirez, supra note 229.
237. See Richard R. Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1201 (2003).
238. The latest of the surveillance “scandals” is the revelation of a widespread surveillance of
Muslim students extending out of state conducted by the NYPD. See Ryan Devereaux, Muslim
student monitored by the NYPD: ‘It just brings everything home’, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2012,
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revelations of eavesdropping, wiretapping, infiltration of groups, and
spying demonstrate the ongoing scrutiny of a minority population
regardless of their actual acts or affiliations. 239 Indeed, recent
investigations show that police agencies made note of how many times
surveilled Muslims prayed and their level of observance of the faith,
conflating practice of the religion with suspicious activity. 240 This sort
of begging the question is unsurprising given that there have been
several exposes of law enforcement using Islamophobic materials for
training purposes. 241 Another form of surveillance are the hearings on
Muslim radicalism held by Representative Peter King on March 10,
2011. 242 Ostensibly, the hearings were to determine the level of
radicalism taking place within the United States as a means of assessing
the threat from homegrown terrorism. What is interesting about these
hearings, coming ten years after 9/11, is the choice of representatives of
the Muslim community. In what has become an easily identified, shopworn tactic, the hearings used “native informants” who corroborated the
prejudices of King and his supporters. Those informants hardly
represent the diverse and multiethnic and multiracial Muslim community
in the United States and provided no data backing the claim that

13.02 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/22/nypd-surveillance-muslim-studentgroups.
Rasul was named in a police report compiled on April 21, 2008. He was one of 18
Muslim students who traveled to upstate New York that day for a whitewater-rafting
trip. Among the group was an undercover officer who monitored the outing, noting
topics of conversation and counting the amount of times they prayed.
“In addition to the regularly scheduled events (rafting), the group prayed at least four
times a day, and much of the conversation was spent discussing Islam and was religious
in nature,” the report noted. Since it was issued there has been no indication the NYPD
brought terrorism-related charges against any of the students. (emphasis added).
For other instances of surveillance, see Local Muslims outraged by alleged FBI surveillance,
lawyers claim, LA NOW, LA TIMES (Feb 23, 2011, 1:13 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
lanow/2011/02/local-muslims-outrage-by-alleged-fbi-surveillance-lawyers-claim.html; Peter Yost
FBI defends surveillance guidelines allegedly targeting Muslims, ARAB NEWS (July 28, 2010),
http://www.arabnews.com/node/351363; Amanda Remling, NJ Muslim Officials Meet in Newark:
Investigation of 2007 NYPD Surveillance, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 3 2012, 5:59 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/308563/20120303/muslim-leaders-new-jersey-nypd-surveillancemeeting.htm.
239. Devereaux, supra note 238.
240. Id.
241. Id. See Michael Powell, In Police Training, a Dark Film on U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/nyregion/in-police-traininga-dark-film-on-us-muslims.html?pagewanted=all.
242. See The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that
Community’s Response: Hearing before the Comm. On Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 1-73 (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72541/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72541.pdf.
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Muslims in the United States were being radicalized at high rates.243
Rather members of law enforcement suggested that this was not the case.
In sum, the hearings presented a stark lack of evidence of the conclusion
that we have a problem with Muslim radicalism. 244 Nevertheless, the
hearings once again reinforced the Muslim-terror connection in the
popular imagination. 245
Terrorism laws, such as the PATRIOT Act, subject Muslims to
regulation and capture for vague crimes such as material support for
terrorist groups. 246 “Material support” provisions of national security
laws are ambiguous and open to a range of interpretations. 247 The
243. The hearings had no recognizable representatives of major Muslim communities like
those in New York; Dearborn, Michigan; or Los Angeles. Rather, the committee chose to hear
testimony from those who have virtually no standing as leaders of any community but who have
since the hearings capitalized on their moment in the spotlight. For an academic approach to
radicalization in Muslim communities, see David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman & Ebrahim Moosa,
Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans (Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://www.sanford.duke.edu/
news/Schanzer_Kurzman_Moosa_Anti-Terror_Lessons.pdf (finding that radicalism has gone down
in the Muslim community). Compare this with Southern Poverty Law Center’s recent report on the
increase in Patriot groups and militia’s, Mark Potok, The Patriot movement explodes, INTELLIGENCE
REP., Spring 2012, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browseall-issues/2012/spring/the-year-in-hate-and-extremism. It is interesting to note that the study has
been challenged on grounds that it does not adequately reflect the actual radicalization of Muslims,
however, it is important to query whether any report absolving Muslims of terroristic tendencies
would satisfy those who have already made prejudgments about the communities precisely because
such a report does not support their view?
244. See The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that
Community’s Response: Hearing before the Comm. On Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 71-120 (2011)
(Statement of Sheriff Leroy Baca, Los Angeles County Sheriff Department), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72541/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72541.pdf.
245. For instance, the very title of some media reports leave one in no doubt of the Manichean
tendencies of “good and evil” that are deployed against Muslims, see, e.g., Gail Russell Chaddock,
Peter King hearings: Are American Muslims the problem or the solution?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 10, 2011, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0310/PeterKing-hearings-Are-American-Muslims-the-problem-or-the-solution. Note that the story is followed
by a list of the top ten American jihadis.
246. For academic treatments of the liberty for security trade off, see generally Natsu Taylor
Saito, Beyond the Citizen/Alien Dichotomy: Liberty, Security, and the Exercise of Plenary Power,
14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 389 (2005); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. CIV. RTS & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1, 1-30 (2003);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA Patriot Act in the Context of
Cointelpro and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051 (2002).
247. 18 U.S.C §2339B (a)(1) (West 2013):
Unlawful conduct—Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a
person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization
(as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist
activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or
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definition is given in the United States code as:
the term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible
or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments
or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include
oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials;
the term “training” means instruction or teaching designed to impart a
specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge; and
the term “expert advice or assistance” means advice or assistance
248
derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.

As is readily discernible, the definition is open to interpretation and
captures any number of activities. Would knowingly selling food or
gasoline to members of the Sinn Fein—once regarded as terrorists by the
United Kingdom and freedom fighters by the Irish—result in a violation
of the law? To answer this question requires the ordinary person to
know whether that organization is on a list of terrorist organizations and
whether this activity constitutes material support. The list of terrorist
organizations is maintained by the Department of State and it is not
comprehensive; therefore, it is possible that a charitable donation
overseas may lead to prosecution for material support here249 for terrorist
organizations includes non-fungible support like expert advice even for
non-violent or humanitarian reasons. 250 As a result, the possibility of
lengthy detention or even internment is an ever-present concern.
The increased preoccupation with “homegrown” terrorists ten years
after the attacks has renewed the need for hyper-vigilance on the part of
“real” Americans. After 9/11, the round up and detention of Muslim
men and their ongoing detention amounted to de facto internment. 251
that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2)
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).
248. 18 U.S.C. §2339A(b)(1) (West 2013).
249. Kavitha Rajagopalan, Charitable donation or material support for terrorism?, PBS (Aug.
18, 2010, 6:03 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/opinion/charitable-donation-ormaterial-support-for-terrorism/2905/.
250. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2009); Larry Abramson & Maria Godoy, The Patriot Act: Key
Controversies, NPR
(Feb.
14,
2006),
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/patriotact/
patriotactprovisions.html; Ariane de Vogue, Speech or Support for Terrorists? Supreme Court
Weighs Patriot Act Provision, ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/supremecourt-weigh-free-speech-material-support-law-first-amendment-rights/story?id=9891625.
251. See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Terrorists & Muslims: The Construction, Performance, and
Regulation of Muslim Identities in the Post-9/11 United States, 7 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 8
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Moreover, Muslims continue to be the objects of suspicion and the
subjects of regulation and surveillance. The extraordinary treatment via
specialized national security laws, use of military commissions, and
attempts at denying habeas corpus erode protections afforded other
groups and make Muslims second-class citizens vulnerable to
expulsion. 252
The inferiority of their status is revealed by the effects of the
specialized laws the general populace is willing to tolerate and, in fact,
demands. The ease with which they are placed in indefinite detention,
tortured, and killed unlike other “real” citizens indicates how far the
marginalization of the constructed enemy has gone. The inability of
civil rights or human rights to trump or even restrain the security
apparatus’s abuse of Muslims goes to show that Muslims have a difficult
time convincing others of their very humanity. As we might be
reminded, the Constitution is not a suicide pact; the liberties it provides
should not become vulnerabilities. Consequently, the law justifies the
regulation of the enemy it has a hand in constructing, and it is not
surprising to find that the anti-shari’ah measures have been defended in
national security terms and as national security measures. In fact, this
linkage also performs the role of linking domestic Muslims as potential
traitors to their global (terroristic) counterparts and legitimates their
regulation through global anti-terror measures. 253
In the global sphere, certain Muslims are expelled from the
protection of civilian laws, human rights, and international laws through
the legitimation of anti-terrorism laws exported by the United States and
the initial suspension of the Geneva Convention.254 Both human rights
and the laws of war protect humans from mistreatment in a time of war.
The withdrawal of such protection, then, can be seen as legally creating
a space in which politics prevails over law and where Muslims can be
treated with impunity. Unfortunately, in the Bush-era, that space could
conceivably be anywhere Muslims are to be found. Indeed, as the 9/11
Commission stated in its report, the boundaries between states have
collapsed: “In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against
American interests ‘over there’ should be regarded just as we regard
terrorism against America ‘over here.’ In this same sense, the American

(2006) [hereinafter “Terrorists & Muslims”].
252. Id.
253. B.E. Whitaker, Exporting the Patriot Act? democracy and the “war on terror” in the
Third World, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1017-1032 (2007).
254. Id.
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homeland is the planet.” 255 Such a sentiment reflects the Bush
administration’s will to do whatever it takes, including refusing recourse
to international law to Muslims in order to prosecute its war on terror
globally.
More recently, in his support of the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2012, Senator Lindsey Graham argued that the military should be
able to detain American citizens in the U.S. indefinitely because
America is “part of the battlefield” and that these alleged traitors should
not be afforded any due process. 256 Reflecting a dialectical relationship
between the local and the global—if not the collapse of the boundary
between the two—it is evident that what happens in the periphery has an
impact on what happens in the core and vice versa. National security
laws gone global regulate Muslims both “over here” and “over there.”
Civil or human rights are marginal, if not obstructions, to the goals of
counterterrorism and must be suspended of necessity. Those who are the
proper subjects of national security then come under the jurisdiction of
specialized laws like those described above and the anti-shari’ah laws
that seek to become a part of that body of law; the civil and human rights
guarantees that have often been touted as universal and applicable to all
show their limits.
B. Effects: Expulsion, Detention and Death
Anti-shari’ah laws currently being proposed or passed in the state
legislatures are examples of an overall strategy to define and
circumscribe the boundaries of belonging in the United States.257 The
255.
256.

See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT supra note 194, at 517 (emphasis added).
Video: Floor Speech: Graham Supports the National Defense Authorization Act,
LINDSEYGRAHAM.COM (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.lindseygraham.com/2011/12/video-floorspeech-graham-supports-the-national-defense-authorization-act/. The floor debate about the Udall
Amendment to the NDAA which would have excised the ability to detain American citizens was
rejected by many senators, including Graham. See also CONG. REC. S8012-8054 (daily ed. Nov. 30,
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-11-30/html/CREC-2011-11-30-pt1PgS8012-2.htm; Ceding Liberty to Terror: Senate Votes Against Due Process Rights, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2011, 11:17 AM ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/12/
ceding-liberty-to-terror-senate-votes-against-due-process-rights/249388/
“It has been the law of the United States for decades that an American citizen on our soil
who collaborates with the enemy has committed an act of war and will be held under the
law of war, not domestic criminal law,” he said. “In World War II it was perfectly
proper to hold an American citizen as an enemy combatant who helped the Nazis. But
we believe, somehow, in 2011, that is no longer fair. That would be wrong. My God,
what are we doing in 2011? Do you not think al Qaeda is trying to recruit people here at
home? Is the homeland the battlefield? You better believe it is the battlefield.”
257. In order to understand the current move to target shari’ah, a brief history of the post 9/11
reactions to Muslims in the public is necessary. Because this article focuses on the anti-shari’ah
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measures, the account here cannot be exhaustive. It aims merely to provide a sense of the larger
attempts at regulating and expelling Muslims. I should also note here that there is another account,
which is that of the societal rejection of these attempts and support for Muslim Americans. For
example the recent outrage at the decision of Lowe’s to no longer advertise during the TLC show
American Muslims caused a number of online campaigns against the retailer. See Greg Sargent,
Turning Up the Heat on Lowe’s and Anti-Muslim Bigotry, The Plum Line, WASHPOST OPINIONS
(Dec. 14, 2011, 12:46 PM ET), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/turning-upthe-heat-on-lowes-and-anti-muslim-bigotry/2011/12/14/gIQARVrAuO_blog.html. However, I do
not present that account here because I seek to describe the context in which the anti-shari’ah bills
arose within the movements against Muslims.
After the 9/11 attacks, the immediate reaction on part of many non-Muslim Americans
was outrage expressed through physical attacks on Muslims and Muslim symbols (mosques and
other property). Indeed, reports of violence and discrimination against Muslims rose markedly in
the aftermath of the attacks. See, e.g., Terrorists & Muslims, supra note 251. These knee-jerk
reactions were to be expected particularly when perpetrated against a “visible” minority. The
federal authorities mimicked this societal convulsion by immediately rounding up Muslim men in
immigration sweeps. Id. at 36. However, after the initial physical violence abated and the
government’s efforts yielded nothing more than full internment centers, a concerted attempt at
demonizing Islam in the social sphere began in earnest. Questions about the ability of Muslims to
be faithful to their religion and patriotic Americans arose exacerbating the already Manichean
discourse. Seemingly overnight, people who had been on the fringe for focusing on Islam and
Muslims in the 1980s and 1990s became experts and media celebrities. Muslims who were willing
to turn on their own communities and religion were elevated as the “voice of reason” and
representatives of “good Muslims.” Those Muslims who either resisted the regulation of state and
society or criticized American policies particularly the domestic measures against Muslim
communities and the two wars on Afghanistan and Iraq were linked to terrorist organizations and
labeled traitors. See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 47 (2003) (citing “We Are Not the
Enemy”: Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims, and Those Perceived to be Arab or Muslim after
September 11, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 6, 14 (Nov. 2002), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1102.pdf; Bias Incidents Against Muslims Are
Soaring, Islamic Council Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at A3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/01/us/bias-incidents-against-muslims-are-soaring-islamiccouncil-says.html; Susan Sachs, For Many American Muslims, Complaints of Quiet but Persistent
Bias, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2002, at A16).
From these anxieties and debates, several other projects arose. In academia, a concerted
push has been made to generate knowledge about Muslims even while foreclosing the space for
Muslim scholars and those deemed “pro-Islam” to speak. Organizations like CampusWatch and
JihadWatch routinely target academics who have either defended Muslims or written about
Muslims or Islam in anything but a negative light. See STEPHEN SHEEHI, ISLAMOPHOBIA: THE
IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST MUSLIMS (2011). In 2007, the concern about how Muslims and
Islamic history is portrayed spilled into the public arena when the Khalil Gibran public school in
New York that sought to teach Arabic language and culture became a point of focus. The Muslim
head of school was removed from her position as a result of a campaign against the school that
labeled it a madrassa. The purported reason for the controversy was that she supported a group of
girls wearing t-shirts printed with “Intifada NYC.” Opponents of the school expressed concern that
students would be taught radical Islamist ideology and one opined that it was nearly impossible to
teach the language without teaching the ideology. Similarly, Muslim parochial schools have also
come under scrutiny as sites of indoctrination and radicalization. See Jennifer Medina, Head of
Arabic Language School Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, A23, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/nyregion/17school.html (detailing the finding of discrimination
against Khalil Gibran’s founding principal, Debbie Montaser).
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laws deploy strategies like redefinition and stereotyping to marginalize
and expel Muslims from the identity of “real” Americans. The architects
of these laws legitimize their agenda through a discourse of national
security and through the construction of a very specific enemy that must
be dealt with through specific laws. That is to say, the redefinition of
Islam to a terrorist religious ideology, the construction of Muslims as
latent terrorists because they are primarily driven by this culture/religion,
and then the application of laws that secure the homeland and those who
rightfully “belong” in it, achieves the broader political goal of denying
Muslims any quarter.
In this section, I want to briefly examine three effects of the broader
project on Muslims both locally and globally: expulsion, detention, and
death. These effects can be placed on a continuum with expulsion or
marginalization being the most likely effect for U.S. Muslims, detention
is an effect that has been felt globally from criminal and INS detentions
“over here” to Guantanamo, Bagram, and Abu Ghraib “over there.”
Finally, death is seldom an effect here in the United States. However,
death is an everyday effect in places like Afghanistan and Iraq where
human rights are made subservient to our security.
1. Expulsion
The act of expelling Muslims (and other undesirables) from the
mainstream has taken on a number of forms. In this Article, I have
argued that the anti-shari’ah laws that have been proposed or enacted are
not simply attempts to protect society from a security threat but also to
stigmatize and ostracize a group of people. The argument that is
advanced in support of these laws is that any tolerance for Muslim life
starts us on the slippery slope to a full-fledged shari’ah-ruled society. 258
As a result, shari’ah and consequently any accommodation for Muslims
in public should be denied. The laws are themselves an attempt to expel
the undesirable Other by preventing its recognition or accommodation in
the public.
As I have noted above, courts in the United States are constrained
from entering into the thickets of interpreting religion by the
Constitution and a clear jurisprudential posture evident in First
Amendment religion cases.259 They rely on neutral principles to make
258. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
259. In Lemon v. Kurtz, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court laid out a three-part test in
order to determine whether a law runs afoul of the first amendment. Id. at 612-613. The test is
comprised of three prongs: first, the state action in question must serve a “secular legislative
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decisions about cases involving religion to avoid precisely the problem
of explicating religious principles or law. Yet the anti-shari’ah/antiforeign law measures in the states want to recreate the wheel to make
absolutely clear that courts may not rely on shari’ah in any way to make
their determinations. If the purpose of this seeming redundancy is to
prevent courts from becoming entangled in religion, there is nothing
novel about this as courts have been constrained from venturing into
such dangerous territory already. 260 However, if these laws want to
eradicate the very mention of or reference to shari’ah in the courts, there
may be serious implications for our judicial process of determining when
to give comity to foreign judgments in the United States. Without the
ability to reference foreign law (that is on occasion based on shari’ah),
this long-established practice would be replaced with an a priori
generalization about the incompatibility of any law “tainted” by shari’ah
with U.S. law. In essence, the very comparison that is required to make
a judgment about whether the foreign decree comports with our values
and our public policy would be rendered impossible. 261 This creates
inefficiencies and burdens by forcing new suits. If the laws do not seek
to force re-litigation but merely use our laws as the yardstick by which
foreign judgments are measured, then as I have argued above, the choice
of law rules, comity, and the supremacy clause already do this work. In
sum, these laws have limited utility for courts in preventing the
purpose”; second, it must have a secular effect; and third, it must not result in excessive
entanglement between church and state. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (referencing
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-614).
260. Id.
261. What is unstated is that, if the court was required to determine the existence of a marriage
without reference to Israeli law that mandates shari’ah in personal law matters for Muslims, the
court would have to substitute some alternative law presumably state law. The result is that courts
would be forced to evaluate each marriage under that alternate law and determine de novo whether
it exists regardless of the length and validity of the relationship entered into in another country
under their laws. Although most marriages would likely pass muster under this form of review, the
prospect that some religiously and legally valid foreign marriages would be rendered invalid simply
because they vary either procedurally or substantively from state law should be cause for concern.
Further, the burden on courts would be increased substantially.
In addition to those whose marriages have been solemnized abroad, couples married in religious
ceremonies within the United States would also face a similar problem unless they can show that
their religious marriage conformed to civil standards. In most states, a marriage requires two
procedural elements: a license and a ceremony. See HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-38 (1988). The state provides the license to marry, however,
the ceremony can either be secular or religious. Id. The result of enforcing laws that seek to ban
shari’ah in state courts may be a state-imposed secular ceremony. While this may be acceptable to
many, it is difficult to argue that shari’ah could be singled out as a “foreign law” as the drafters of
the legislation seek to do; Jewish, Catholic and even some Protestant ceremonies would also be
suspect as they are arguably “foreign” imports.
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encroachment of foreign laws that run against our public policy.262
What they do instead is pass a value judgment about shari’ah as a
barbaric legal code, reducing it to only its most grievous flaws while
valorizing our own legal system as superior, civilized and, therefore,
irreconcilable with shari’ah. That judgment passed not only on a
complex and ancient legal system also marks Muslims as barbaric.
Consequently, the anti-shari’ah proponents might argue that forcing
Muslims to assimilate totally to a more advanced, modern, secular
system by refusing to recognize shari’ah is merely progress and a net
benefit to all.
Should these laws be upheld, they will undoubtedly have their
intended consequence in forcing Muslims as a religious community into
the closet.263 The legal prohibition on relying on shari’ah would have an
impact on contracts, prenuptial agreements, wills, and the ability to
request accommodation for religious practice in the public sphere.
Without reference to the religious law that gives meaning and definition
to Muslim life, how is a court to assess any claim that involves Islam?
For concrete examples of what is at stake for Muslim life in the United
States, we can examine two hypotheticals: first is that of a shari’ah
compliant will in probate and the second a private contract based on
shari’ah law.
Consider a will that provides for the distribution of the estate based
on the shari’ah principles. In his suit against Oklahoma, Muneer Awad
262. Focusing on religion, these anti-shari’ah laws are not noxious because they attack
religion in the public square. Indeed, Liberalism’s long history has been replete with attempts at
placing religion squarely in its proper place: in the private. See generally JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION (2011). At least theoretically, Liberalism demands this closeting and
Marxism goes further and requires that for true human emancipation to occur, religion must be
eradicated entirely. See generally Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER (Richard Tucker, ed., 1978) (Rather, these laws target one religion in particular insisting
that it is not a religion but rather an ideology itself and revealing the anti-shari’ah movements own
deeply ideological connections. While we might analyze the current instances Islamophobic
legislation as racism, it goes well beyond that. These events partake of a broader imperial ideology
in which law is instrumentalized to both create subjects and govern them. See Mamdani supra note
234. As such, the attempt to pass anti-shari’ah laws is one instance of the global regulation of
Muslims in the war on terror, regardless of what they have or have not done but based on who they
are. Moreover, legally and socially, the power to define rests in the hands of those who seek to
govern, who wield both social and political power. The result of the definition of Muslims in
consonance with categories generated in the war against global terrorism is that Muslims continue
to receive the attention of the “good guys” who are bravely rolling back the influence of the “bad
guys.”
263. The Attorney General of Oklahoma has vowed to move forward with defending the Save
Our State amendment now that the preliminary injunction has been upheld. The next step is a trial
on the merits in which the court will decide on the Constitutionality of the amendment on
substantive grounds and issue a permanent injunction.
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made precisely this claim. 264 In his will, he incorporates by reference
the Sahih Bukhari compilation of Hadiths (the examples and sayings of
the Prophet Muhammad) that is one of the sources of shari’ah. 265 Such
a will could not be probated in Oklahoma because it references a
shari’ah source. The only work around is to put all the provisions in the
will itself in neutral language.
Similarly, if two parties form a contract that will be governed by
shari’ah law and one party fails to perform, these laws may make it
impossible to enforce the contract. Take, for instance, a contract for the
supply of halal meat where the seller breaches by failing to adhere to the
halal standards of butchering. 266 How is one to determine whether the
contract has been breached? The court would have to apply neutral
principles to assess whether the procedures were fair without getting into
the substance of shari’ah laws but the breach is in the process of
butchering, which necessitates an inquiry into shari’ah requirements.267
However, this would be proscribed under the law as it is written. The
court would have to assess the contract under entirely neutral principles,
in fact, rewriting the agreement. The result is that none of these
agreements would likely be enforceable through a civil court.
Of course, it is possible to argue that requiring Muslims to couch
their agreement in neutral language in the first place (although in the
halal meat scenario, it is virtually impossible) is not an onerous burden.
However, this argument fails to address the question why Muslims
should bear the stigma of having their religious law denied recognition
by the state? 268 One may infer that this erasure of Muslims from the
public is precisely what is desired by the architects of the law, despite
their denials of such motives.
In addition to these laws that prevent Muslims from seeking judicial
intervention, entities that seek to deny Muslims accommodation for
264. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
265. Leah Nelson, Oklahoma’s Shariah Law Ban Creates Controversy, INTELLIGENCE REP.,
Spring 2011, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-allissues/2011/spring/oklahoma-shariah-law-ban-creates-controversy.
266. Much like the requirements of Halacha that food be kosher, in order for meat to be halal
it must be ritually slaughtered by a Muslim. Observant Muslims will not eat meat that is not halal.
267. For instance, in order to determine whether the contract had been performed, the court
would have to inquire into whether the ritual killing had been done according to shari’ah standards.
That would mean taking testimony about the form of the killing and the words spoken, which are of
course embedded in the religion.
268. It should be noted here that Muslims would not be the only ones adversely impacted.
Similar measures inevitably bear consequences for other religious groups like Jews, Hindus and
Buddhists. In the case of the Arizona law, the lumping of “outsider” religions is explicit. See supra
notes 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Arizona law).
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prayer, ritual slaughter, or the wearing of headscarves are numerous.269
Recent discussions about loyalty oaths are another form of marking
Muslims as Other. 270 These oaths seek to elicit certain kinds of political
conformity voluntarily or force a national identity on Muslims that other
U.S. citizens do not have to adhere to. Moreover, the requirement reifies
the essentialism of Muslim identity in which following Islam as a
religion forecloses the possibility of a political affiliation with the
nation. It also reifies the identity of the “real” American, defining it is
an identity that cannot be tainted by Muslimness.
Another form of expulsion that has occurred from the outset of the
War on Terror is rendition. The practice of removing Muslims and
sending them to countries in which they can be tortured is a stark effect
of the construction and extraordinary treatment of the enemy. Those
rendered are given no due process, they are not even informed of what
they have been accused and where they are going. The treatment of
prisoners assumed to be guilty includes stripping and photographing
them nude, shaving their face and heads, depriving them of sleep,
slapping them, dousing them with water, forcing them to stand for
lengthy periods of time, forcing them to assume stress positions, placing
them in cells where they cannot stand, and “walling” to name a few
practices. All the cases reported in the public were Muslim men. The
U.S. government’s willingness to simply disappear these people
regardless of their innocence or guilt chillingly reminds us of what
269. See Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 318 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003); Spell v.
Muhammad, 756 So.2d 748 (Miss. 2000); E.E.O.C. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 911 (N.D.
Tex. 1993).
270. See Huma Khan & Amy Bingham, GOP Debate: Newt Gingrich’s Comparison of
NEWS
(June
14,
2011),
Muslims
and
Nazis
Sparks
Outrage,
ABC
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/gop-debate-newt-gingrichs-comparison-muslims-nazissparks/story?id=13838355#.Txr2qJihDzI:
At the New Hampshire debate Monday night, Gingrich responded to questions about
loyalty tests for administration officials, saying, “[t]he Pakistani who emigrated to the
U.S., became a citizen, built a car bomb which luckily failed to go off in Times Square,
was asked by the federal judge, how could he have done that when he signed and when
he swore an oath to the United States. And he looked at the judge and said, ‘you’re my
enemy. I lied.’”
“Now, I just want to go out on a limb here. I’m in favor of saying to people, if you’re not
prepared to be loyal to the United States, you will not serve in my administration,
period,” Gingrich added, to applause.
But Gingrich didn’t stop there, despite an attempt by moderators to interject. He
compared hiring Muslims to how Americans dealt with Nazis in the 1940s: “We did this
in dealing with the Nazis. We did this in dealing with the Communists. And it was
controversial both times and both times we discovered after a while, you know, there are
some genuinely bad people who would like to infiltrate our country. And we have got to
have the guts to stand up and say, ‘No.’”
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occurs when we treat some groups as requiring extraordinary laws or as
deserving no legal protection at all.
Discriminatory legal treatment has social consequences, it evinces a
certain permission to follow suit. Crimes against Muslims in the United
States after 9/11 have risen dramatically. 271 Public officials speak about
Muslims in terms that would not be tolerated against any other group
(except Latinos) in the United States. 272 Increasingly, Muslims are
suffering employment harms from refusals of accommodation for
religious practice to discrimination in hiring and promotion to wrongful
termination. 273 In sum, the discourse in the public sphere and official
support for unequal treatment has material effects on the lives of
Muslims who bear the group responsibility for acts done by individuals
and, therefore, must be subject to collective punishment.
2. Internment and Detention
Another effect of the discourse on Muslims and national identity is
the fear of the failure of vigilance and the inevitability of another attack.
There is more sympathy with the anti-shari’ah laws that seek to draw a
closer connection between the practice of Islam and terrorism as that
fear is ratcheted up in the public. As the original Tennessee bill
evidences, the prevalent view is that shari’ah is part and parcel of
terrorism, which makes it difficult to separate “peaceful” practice of
religion (and the adherence to shari’ah) with a commitment to violently
overthrow the state. 274 Anti-shari’ah measures are then justified as a
first step to preventing radical Islam from getting a foothold.
Of course, merely preventing shari’ah from being enforced civilly
among private citizens may be necessary but it certainly is not sufficient.
It does not deal with Muslims themselves and the threat that they pose; it
merely seeks to stem their ideology. This has revived the possibility of

271. Aziz Huq, Defend Muslims, Defend America, NY TIMES, June 19, 2011, A27, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/opinion/20huq.html?ref=shariaislamiclaw.
272. See supra note 270. Despite the fact that Gingrich’s comments sparked outrage, similar
sentiments were expressed by Herman Cain and other Republican candidates. See, e.g., Ron Paul
Takes Swipes at GOP Rivals, Says Michele Bachmann “Hates Muslims” ABC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2011
8:31 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/12/ron-paul-takes-swipes-at-gop-rivals-saysmichele-bachmann-hates-muslims. See also Cyra Akila Choudhury, Collateral Damage: The
Ghettoization of Muslims in the Race for the White House, in RACE 2008: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
ON A HISTORICAL CAMPAIGN (Mendible, ed., 2010).
273. Steven Greenhouse, Muslims Report Rising Discrimination at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23,
2010,
B1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/business/
24muslim.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=business.
274. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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internment as both punishment and prevention. 275 Albeit these calls
come from a small minority of those on the far right; they are present
and have found some sympathy among the public.276 While camps are a
visceral threat, detention in immigration centers and jails is a reality. 277
Immigration law has provided a ready basis for the regulation of
Muslims from the period after the Oklahoma bombing to the present.
Indeed, it was primarily immigration law that was the basis for the
detention of approximately five thousand Muslim and Arab men in the
aftermath of 9/11. 278
Surveillance and profiling has led to the capture of Muslims but not
all of these people have committed crimes or violated immigration laws.
Muslims were held without charge or bail as material witnesses
immediately after the attacks even when they had nothing to offer by
way of evidence. 279 Post 9/11, the government shrouded this practice in
a veil of secrecy, refusing to articulate on what basis these witnesses
were held. 280 In some cases, there were no substantial grounds for
believing that the witnesses had any real information yet the witnesses
were held for extended periods of time. Material witnesses and
immigration detainees were not simply held and released once they were
found to be innocent; sometimes their incarceration lasted several years
and resulted in expulsion through deportation.281
275. Nina Bernstein, Relatives of Interned Japanese-Americans Side With Muslims, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
3,
2007,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/nyregion/
03detain.html?pagewanted=all.
276. MICHELE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR RACIAL PROFILING IN
WORLD WAR II AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004). See, e.g., Chris K. Iijima, Shooting Justice
Jackson’s “Loaded Weapon” at Ysar Hamdi: Judicial Abdication at the Convergence of Korematsu
and McCarthy, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 132 n.132 (2004); Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale
Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A “Constant Caution” in a Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN L.J. 37,
40, 45 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime,
2003 WIS. L. REV. 273 (2003).
277. One man still locked up from 9/11 sweeps, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 14, 2006, 6:31:54
PM ET), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15264274/ns/us_news-security/t/one-man-still-lockedsweeps/.
278. David Cole, Terror Financing, Guilt by Association and the Paradigm of Prevention in
the ‘War on Terror,’ in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S CHALLENGE 248 (Andrea Bianchi &
Alexis Keller eds. 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262792.
279. Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of “Hold Until Cleared”: Reexamining
Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677,
679-681 (2005).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 689-690:
The story of Mohammed Bellahouel’s detention shows as starkly as that of Brandon
Mayfield how judges have authorized “material witness” detentions on unsubstantiated
allegations and deferred to prosecutors’ claims regarding the need for secrecy. In
October 2001, federal agents arrested Mr. Bellahouel, an Algerian immigrant working as
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Although no internment camps of the kinds found in the World War
II-era have been established or are likely to be established, different
kinds of camps are emerging as proxies. Recently, the existence of
secret jails has come to light. 282 These Communication Management
Units house a disproportionate number of Muslims along with tax
resisters, eco-activists, and other convicts. According to a lawyer from
the Center for Constitutional Rights (“CCR”):
“There is a tenfold over-representation of Muslim prisoners at the
CMUs,” he says. “So 6 percent of the national prison population is
Muslim, and somewhere in the neighborhood of between 66 and 72
283
percent of prisoners at the CMUs are Muslim.”

The CCR also claims that these prison units are used to segregate and
isolate those Muslims who are considered leaders or jailhouse lawyers
from the general population. Prisoners are separated from their families
a waiter at a restaurant in a South Florida strip mall. The affidavit filed in support of the
government’s application for a “material witness” arrest warrant alleged that Mr.
Bellahouel had seen a movie in that mall with one of the 9/11 terrorists. The source of
this information was purportedly an unidentified employee of the movie theatre. The
affidavit speculated: “It is likely that Bellahouel would have waited on both
[Mohammed] Atta and [Marwan] al Shehhi since Bellahouel had worked at the
restaurant for 10 months, and both Atta and al Shehhi were frequent patrons during shifts
that Bellahouel worked.” The affidavit went on to reveal candidly (if inadvertently) that
the FBI had no real reason to suspect Mr. Bellahouel of any wrongdoing. It stated: “In
the meantime, the FBI has been unable to rule out the possibility that the respondent is
somehow linked to, or possesses knowledge of, the terrorist attacks.”
Despite an affidavit setting forth nothing but conjecture, relying on an undisclosed
source, and conceding that the government had no idea whether Mr. Bellahouel had any
useful information, a judge in Virginia issued a warrant for his arrest as a “material
witness” to the 9/11 attacks. The unsupported inferential leap that Mr. Bellahouel must
have waited on two of the 9/11 terrorists is as senseless as the FBI’s contention in Mr.
Mayfield’s case that, because there was no record of Mr. Mayfield traveling to Spain, he
must have done so under a false identity. Just as the FBI’s reason for incarcerating Mr.
Bellahouel was that it had “been unable to rule out” any possible terrorist ties, the
government argued three years later that it could not “exclude the possibility that
Mayfield was criminally” involved in the Spain bombings.
As unsettling as the fact that Mr. Bellahouel was incarcerated on such thin allegations
were the lengths to which the executive and judicial branches of the government went to
keep the entire incident from the public. Mr. Bellahouel was secretly held in custody for
five months. He was released around March 2002 after testifying before the grand jury in
Virginia and being cleared of terrorist links.
282. Margot Williams & Alyson Hurt, DATA & GRAPHICS: Population Of The
Communications
Management
Units,
NPR
(Aug.
24,
2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/08/134227726/data-graphics-population-of-the-communicationsmanagement-units.
283. Carrie Johnson & Margot Williams, ‘Guantanamo North’: Inside Secretive U.S. Prisons,
NPR (Mar. 3, 2011, 1:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134168714/guantanamo-northinside-u-s-secretive-prisons.
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and are allowed limited human contact with their families. The CCR
claims that the Bureau of Prisons use the CMU’s to retaliate against
those who attempt to stand up for themselves in prison under the guise
of preventing radicalism. 284
It is interesting to note that the Communications Management Units
are nicknamed “Guantanamo North.” Indeed, these facilities have taken
a lesson from overseas detention centers and prisons like Guantanamo,
Bagram, and Camp Delta. The United States continues to hold civilians
in detention without bringing charges against them. Recently, the
government has conceded that a majority of people detained for being
Taliban were actually not members of that group. 285 Many were
released after relatively short incarcerations, but not all civilians have
been so lucky. Others in these camps have been interrogated, tortured,
and killed in custody. 286 In other words, the “enemy” is not constructed
necessarily through their acts but rather through their beliefs and their
identity. As such, any Muslim is vulnerable to marking as a terrorist
whose rights are secondary to security.
Capturing suspected terrorists and holding them without charge or
representation is not infrequent; Philippe Sands notes that it is an
ongoing practice that was started at the outset of the War on Terror.287
The recent National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 reinforces the
power of the executive to capture and hold those suspected of terrorism
without trial “until the end of hostilities.” What is remarkable about this
new bill is that it extends the power to detain to American citizens
captured abroad. In the U.S., Muslims may be detained through
extensive national security and immigration laws, while in places like
Afghanistan, they are subject to the requirements of a “war” which has
resulted in random capture and internment without charge, possibly for
life. 288
284. Aref, et al. v. Holder, et al., CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/
ourcases/current-cases/aref-et-al-v-holder-et-al (last visited Jan. 19, 2013); see also Muneer I.
Ahmed, Guantanamo is Here: The Military Commissions Act and Noncitizen Vulnerability, 2007 U.
CHI. L. F. 1 (2007).
285. Gareth Porter, ‘Most captured Taliban were civilians,’ AL JAZEERA (June 27, 2011,
15:04), http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/06/2011627141529522163.html.
286. Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A.,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/us/politics/
17detain.html?ref=ciainterrogations.
287. See PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: A WHISTLE-BLOWING ACCOUNT OF HOW BUSH
AND BLAIR ARE TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS 160 (2006); ANDY WORTHINGTON,
THE GUANTANAMO FILES: THE STORIES OF THE 774 DETAINEES IN AMERICA’S ILLEGAL PRISON
188 (2007).
288. WORTHINGTON, supra note 287, at 188.
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C. Collateral Damage/Death
Those incarcerated within the prison system of the United States
have protections of laws and a civil society that inquires into such
unfortunate incidents as custodial death. As a result, prisoners held
inside the country’s borders are less likely to die in custody or be subject
to the degree of torture suffered by Muslims in remote places like Iraq or
Afghanistan and in places to which they may be rendered secretly
through the security apparatus.289 In addition to the targeted killing of
militants and the deaths in custody, the vast majority of the loss of life at
the hands of U.S. forces has occurred from drone attacks and bombing.
In conducting the war on terror, the United States has been the
catalyst in the loss of over a hundred thousand Iraqi civilian lives.290 In
Afghanistan, conservative estimates claim that a third of the people
killed in drone attacks are civilians.291 On the other hand, the Brookings
Institute claims that more than six hundred civilians have been killed,
approximately ten for every militant.292 Aside from bombings, there
have also been several stories of U.S. troops killing civilians for sport
and of U.S. contractors killing unarmed civilians in Iraq and
Afghanistan. 293 From these stories, it is obvious that one effect of the
creation of a Muslim enemy, making it the object of national security, is
the ease with which that enemy can be killed and the lesser value of
Muslim lives. 294 And that killing is legally justified through the clinical
term collateral damage or exceptionalized as in the extrajudicial murders
of civilians, nevertheless fails to address the underlying rationale for
why such a high cost to civilians is possible at all.
Judith Butler notes that some lives are not grievable; 295 that is, they
289. Id.
290. Iraq death toll ‘soared post-war,’ BBC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2004, 16:09 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3962969.stm.
291. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone
Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010, NEW AM. FOUND., 3 (Feb. 24, 2010), http://
counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf.
292. Daniel L. Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, BROOKINGS (July 14, 2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman.
293. Craig Whitlock, Members of Stryker Combat Brigade in Afghanistan accused of killing
civilians for sport, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2010, 9:39 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/18/AR2010091803935.html.
294. David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/
middleeast/14blackwater.html.
295. I borrow this term from Judith Butler who has written eloquently about the
unmournability of the lives of some people. See JUDITH BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWER OF
MOURNING AND VIOLENCE (2006).
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evoke no empathy for their deaths. 296 Certainly the construction of the
dead as belonging to an uncivilized, premodern, and violent culture and
religion coupled with the antiseptic language used to describe what they
experience (collateral damage, collateral mortality, precision bombing)
makes distance and avoidance of the stark realities much more
possible. 297 I would go so far as to suggest that it is not merely that there
is no empathy for the deaths of Muslim civilians and even combatants
but that among some supporters of the war, there is a sense that these
deaths are necessary. 298 They are the just desserts of a people who
should collectively pay for the crimes of a few nominal co-religionists.
This idea of collective punishment, the idea that entire populations can
be subjected to violence in order to suppress resistance or to punish the
few is one that dates back to colonial times if not before and acceptable
for those waging the war on terror. 299
The ongoing vilification of Muslims starts with seemingly
inconsequential assaults like their degradation through these antishari’ah laws and unequal treatment or protection by the state and in
society. Yet it progresses easily to justifications for collective
punishment: from mass surveillance to the indefinite detention of
Muslim men without charge or even proof of terrorist activity, to their
custodial deaths, and then ending in the indiscriminate killings of
296. JUDITH BUTLER, FRAMES OF WAR: WHEN IS LIFE GRIEVABLE? 31 (2009):
The shared condition of precariousness implies that the body is constitutively social and
interdependent—a view clearly confirmed in different ways by both Hobbes and Hegel.
Yet, precisely because each body finds itself potentially threatened by others who are, by
definition, precarious as well, forms of domination follow. This standard Hegelian point
takes on specific meanings under contemporary conditions of war: the shared condition
of precariousness leads not to reciprocal recognition, but to a specific exploitation of
targeted populations, of lives that are not quite lives, cast as “destructible” and
“ungreivable.” Such populations are “lose-able,” or can be forfeited, precisely because
they are framed as being already lost of forfeited; they are cast as threats to human life as
we know it rather than as living populations in need of protection from illegitimate state
violence, famine, or pandemics. Consequently, when such lives are lost they are not
greivable, since, in the twisted logic that rationalizes their death, the loss of such
populations is deemed necessary to protect the lives of “the living.”
297. Id.
298. Members of my own extended family were killed in the 9/11 attacks on New York. See
also Rick Hampson, For families of Muslim 9/11 Victims, a new pain, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 2010,
1:56
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-09-03-1Amuslims911_CV_N.htm.
According the Iraq Body Count, the number of people killed in Iraq alone is over 100,000. See
IRAQBODYCOUNT.ORG, www.Iraqbodycount.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
299. For a discussion of collective punishment meted out in the United States, see ANNY
BAKALIAN & MEHDI BOZOGMEHR, BACKLASH 9/11: MIDDLE EASTERN AND MUSLIM AMERICANS
RESPOND 1-22 (2009); for a discussion of international collective punishment, see Larry Cata
Backer, The Fuhrer Principle of International Law: Individual Responsibility and Collective
Punishment, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 509 (2002).
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Muslims in drone attacks. All attempts at armed resistance are neatly
folded back into the narrative of their barbarism and aggression,
reinforcing our own sense of justification for the wars. Nonviolent
resistance is all that remains morally available to those who are subject
to overwhelming (but therapeutic) violence. Civil rights in the United
States and human rights are, then, an important means by which to resist
the juggernaut of a globalized national security regime that threatens us
with Dystopia 2. 300 But these means must overcome the superior claims
of national security and a state that has the power to disregard law or
make it up to suit when expedient. 301
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE SECURITY
In this Article I have made the argument that these anti-shari’ah
laws are not about protecting the United States’ secular legal system nor
are they about national security. It has challenged the use of family law
as evidence that the laws are a necessity. The cases fail to support the
claim that Muslims are using shari’ah in family law as a Trojan horse for
the infiltration of the state. Rather, these laws reflect a continuing
hostility towards Muslims and the will to discriminate on the basis of
religion. Through the Article I have traced some of the methods used in
stereotyping and vilifying Muslims in the United States and globally,
and it has examined some of the effects of such identity constructions.
In sum, I have argued that even if they are ineffective as national
security laws and even if they are struck down as unconstitutional, these
anti-shari’ah laws have a social effect on Muslims. The condemnation
harm is felt before the challenge reaches the courthouse doorsteps. As
such, they must be taken seriously.
Further, I argue that what is done to Muslims within the United
States can be linked to what is done to Muslims globally in the War on
Terror. There is a dialectical relationship of fear and loathing of
Muslims both here and there—the identities co-construct each other.
The anti-shari’ah measures denying Muslims the same rights as those
given to other religious communities parallel the denial of human rights
or international law that are available to all people to Muslims globally.
The tendency then is to essentialize Muslims in a way that makes them
300. See supra notes 1 and 2 and accompanying text describing Dystopia 1 & 2.
301. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 contains a “sense of Congress” provision that
recognizes the broad powers afforded the President in the event of a serious threat to national
security. For instance, the Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. §331-335) and the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C.A.
§5121-5207) allow the President to use the military to restore public order. 6 U.S.C. §466(a)(5)
(2006).
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forever alien regardless of where they are and the result is a shrugging
willingness to treat them with impunity and to sacrifice “their” security
for ours.
In the rush to create a visible enemy, to delineate the threat, what is
often forgotten is the vulnerability of Muslims who are caught between
the hammer of a nationalist, exclusionary identity construction espoused
in national security law and the anvil of an Islamist political ideology
that uses religion and constructs Muslim identity to similarly exclude the
vast majority of Muslims. 302 What are the consequences of acting and
legislating based on the belief that Muslims cannot be real Americans or
that they should be denied the protection of human rights globally?
What is the cost of marginalizing a community as “alien” or outcast? I
want to suggest two very real consequences.303
A. Other Forms of Terror
First, the concentration on Muslims and Islamist terrorism fails to
bring to public attention the threat of terrorism committed by people like
Anders Breivik and Timothy McVeigh. In spite of the media attention,
the 2011 King hearings on so-called homegrown “Muslim radicalism”
failed to bring to light the kind of evidence that would demonstrate that
such radicalism is occurring in the Muslim communities. Rather recent
data shows that radicalism is in fact declining. Yet the threat from farright extremists that recruit young people for their militias has been an
ongoing threat to the lives and security of many minorities in the United
States. 304 Moreover, such a focus on Muslims after 9/11 fails to examine
the growing societal issues that is giving rise to violence against
302. Muslims have been on the frontline of terrorism for several decades. Recent attacks have
targeted Pakistan, Morocco, Bangladesh, and Indonesia to name a few countries. See, e.g.,
Timeline: Terrorist attacks in Pakistan in May 2011, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 25, 2011,
available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/175661/timeline-terrorist-attacks-in-pakistan-in-may-2011/;
Moroccan tourist café terrorist attack leaves at least 15 dead, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2011,
15:16 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/28/marrakech-tourist-cafe-terrorist-attack;
Eben Kaplan, Bangladesh: Nationwide Attacks Raise Fears of Growing Islamist Presence, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/bangladesh/bangladesh-nationwideattacks-raise-fears-growing-islamist-presence/p8767; Farouk Arnaz, Indonesian Police Targeted in
“Terror Attack,” THE JAKARTA GLOBE (May 25, 2011), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/
breaking-news-indonesian-police-targeted-in-terror-attack/443121.
303. See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA Patriot Act
in the Context of Cointelpro and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051
(2002).
304. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Laurie Goodstein, Domestic Terrorism Hearing Opens with
Contrasting Views on Dangers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, A15, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/us/politics/11king.html.
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minorities and fails to label exactly the same acts as terror. In other
words, the current national security focus on Muslims as the main threat
blinds us to the possibility of other threats that come from secular or
other religious groups who are actively seeking to undermine our secular
society and way of life. 305 That makes prevention much harder.
I have argued elsewhere 306 that racial profiling as a tactic to prevent
terrorism is bound to fail; over the course of the last ten years, I have
been largely vindicated in that view. Further, I have argued that
focusing on one community leaves a rather large blind spot which other
groups are likely to exploit. As mentioned above, this blind spot was
precisely what led to the immediate attribution of the Norway massacre
to Muslims and immigrants. 307 What is even more perplexing is that
despite the fact that a “homegrown,” “real” Norwegian perpetrated the
violence, the following debate was about whether further immigration
curbs should be put into place. 308 In addition, the connection between
Anders Breivik and the propaganda of U.S. proponents of Islamophobia,
did little to quell the appetite for such extremism on the part of both U.S.
politicians and anti-Muslim groups. 309 There was little conversation
about the kind of prejudice that fueled the steps needed to prevent
racism. Rather, it is perplexing to note that even when Muslims have
not committed acts of terrorism, they have been made to pay.
B. Alienating Stakeholders and Creating Insecurity
This brings me to the next problem of an exclusionary national
security law. A legal regime based on stereotypes that uses identities
like race and religion rather than politics and actions runs the risk of
alienating those best able to help secure communities from terrorist
violence. Profiling and surveillance and gathering data on religious
observance is wrong headed because it implies that all Muslims are
suspect. More dramatically, the indiscriminate killings of Muslims
globally in the War on Terror particularly through drone attacks and
bombing is precisely the kind of security action that implies that we do

305. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing Anders Breivik). A similar
reaction followed Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing. See also Terror from the Right,
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/terror-fromthe-right (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (detailing the number of terrorist actions from the right since
the Oklahoma bombing).
306. See Terrorists & Muslims, supra note 251.
307. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing Breivik).
308. Id.
309. Id.
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not care who “they” are because “they” are all one indistinguishable
enemy population.
Alienating, stigmatizing, and expelling Muslims from the normal
protection of laws, demanding assimilation and a show of patriotism
through the conversion away from Islam or forcibly closing the public
space to any show of “Muslim-ness,” driving the community into the
shadows, will not work to secure us. Rather, these strategies become
recruiting tools for organizations that prey upon the disaffection and
resentments that they create. It is not difficult to imagine that the
Taliban will use the accidental burning of Qur’ans at the infamous
Bagram Airbase as proof that the United States is engaged in a crusade.
The powerful combination of ongoing civilian deaths through bombings,
the threat of Qur’an burnings by a radical Christian preacher in Florida,
vocal racialized discourse by political leaders, followed by actual Qur’an
burnings at a notorious site of torture makes for an easy inference that
Islam is the target. And terror organizations like al Qaeda offer an
opportunity to turn those resentments against imperialism and
occupation into deadly action.
C. Security with Inclusion
If identity-based strategies do not work, we must find another way.
I want to suggest that what will provide security is the continued
integration that most Muslims in the United States have achieved despite
attempts to marginalize them after 9/11. A national security framework
that encourages trust in law enforcement and that deals in good faith
with all communities would work better to secure our communities. As
Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca noted in his testimony to the King
Commission:
According to the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), utilizing
information provided by respected organizations such as the
Congressional Research Service, the Heritage Foundation, and
Southern Poverty Law Center, there have been 77 total terror plots by
domestic, non-Muslim perpetrators since 9/11. In comparison, there
have been 41 total plots by both domestic and international Muslim
perpetrators during the same period. Reports indicate that American
Muslims helped foil seven of the last ten plots propagated by Al-Qaeda
within the United States. According to MPAC, evidence clearly
indicates a general rise in violent extremism across ideologies.
Clearly, we should be examining radicalization as an issue that affects
all groups regardless of religion . . . . It is critical to build mutually
respectful relationships with American Muslim communities and
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endeavor to work together to protect all Americans whether locally or
internationally . . . . The Muslim Community in Los Angeles is an
active participant in the securing of our Homeland . . . . When I made
critical outreach to the community after 9/11, I was overwhelmed by
the number of Muslims who, while under threat from misinformed
sources, were ready and willing to connect with law enforcement to
310
help keep the peace.

As Sheriff Baca notes, without vital intelligence and trust, ensuring
security becomes more difficult. He aptly points out that it is impossible
to “arrest or enforce your way out of the radicalization issue.” Despite
the belief in some quarters that muscular police action and even
extrajudicial killings are justified, the war on terror has not given the
Executive Branch a blank check. The Supreme Court has acted to
protect the liberties of American citizens by pushing back on the
national security establishment.311
Similarly, since the beginning of the War on Terror and the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a vigorous push back in the realm
of the international on the Bush doctrine of preemptive attacks and his
Manichean worldview. There has been some resurgence of critical
thought drawn from earlier periods of colonialism and imperialism that
has shed light on the global ambitions behind the War on Terror that
threatened nations with extinction. More needs to be done to interrogate
the identity construction of the enemy that operates both globally and
locally and that seems to allow for a legally justified discrimination.
Greater critical energies need to be focused on the failure of human
rights to protect vulnerable populations from the demands of security.
After all, we must include Muslims and their insecurity in the calculus if
we are to ever win the War on Terror rather than fighting it endlessly.
Recognizing the humanity of Muslims globally and valuing their
lives is the promise of human rights and international law. Allowing all
Americans to believe in whatever religion with pride and safety, this is
the promise of the United States and the vision of our founding fathers
and mothers. The current anti-shari’ah measures and the rest of the
spectrum of legal and police/military interventions, the discursive
methods and social effects of the creation of a vulnerable minority
310. See Statement of Sheriff Leroy Baca, supra note 244.
311. U.S. v. Ghailani, 743 F.Supp.2d 261 (2010) (holding that evidence obtained through
illegal means may be excluded); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the
Geneva Convention was applicable and that military commissions were illegal under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and international law); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)(holding that
Guantanamo detainees can invoke habeas corpus).
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singled out for punishment based on identity betray both these promises.
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